LTTE Air Attacks List

Demise of the Tamil Tigers? Perhaps, but an Appreciation

By Zachary Abuza
February 23, 2009 10:27 AM

“The report of my death is an exaggeration” – Mark Twain

While I would love to eulogize about the death of the Tamil Tigers, it is of course premature. However, I offer this “appreciation” of the Tamil Tigers, an organization that has been, bar none, the most cutting-edge, adaptive and creative terrorist organization in the world. There is not a terrorist organization in the world that has not adopted LTTE tactics or at least aspired to do so. As the LTTE has never targeted the United States, it has been a low priority for law enforcement, military and the intelligence services. Yet, the Tamil Tigers merit study.

Founded in May 1976, by Villupilai Prabhakaran, the Tamil Tigers – formerly the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) – grew from being a several thousand man guerilla force to being at its height a conventional force with some 10,000 combatants. Though their military collapse since mid 2006, has been surprisingly swift, one cannot forget that for years, they fought the Sri Lankan military to a standstill and controlled a significant amount of territory. Their nearly forty-year struggle is highlighted by firsts and superlatives:

• The LTTE have perpetrated more suicide bombings than Hamas and Hezbollah combined.
• The LTTE’s suicide vest design has been copied by nearly a dozen organizations.
• The LTTE is an equal opportunity employer: the LTTE has used female bombers in a more than 3-2 ratio. The LTTE fields a conventional women’s corp.
• The LTTE has used suicide bombing as a weapon of choice in terms of targeted assassination, including the 1991 assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the near assassination of Sri Lankan President Kumaratanga in 1999. The LTTE assassinated nearly 50 prominent moderate Tamil leaders, and is estimated to have killed thousands of moderate and anti-LTTE Tamils.
• The LTTE has used suicide frogman and other special operatives to penetrate far behind enemy lines.
• The LTTE targeted pillars of the Sri Lankan economy, including bombings of the Central Bank in 1996 and Columbo’s World Trade Center in 1997. In 2001, LTTE operatives penetrated the international airport and destroyed three jetliners, half of Airlanka’s fleet, in addition to 23 military aircraft.
• The LTTE was the first organization to post martyrs’ posters for the “Black Tigers” their suicide corp.
• The LTTE is the first sub state actor to use suicide naval vessels. There have been over 40 suicide naval attacks since June 1990, seven years before the USS Cole attack.
• The LTTE had a full-fledged navy, and many of their craft were indigenously designed and built. Sri Lankan forces recently captured a submarine in its final stages of construction.
• The LTTE was one of only two terrorist organizations to use a WMD (the other being Aom Shinrikyo). The Tigers used a chlorine gas bomb against Sri Lankan forces in 1990.
• The LTTE became the first sub-state actor to acquire an air force. Though used in desperation over the weekend, in two attempted “kamikaze” attacks, the LTTE has used their Czech trainers 9 times since March 2007 Sri Lankan forces captured six airfields in LTTE territory.

While their innovations on the battlefield were remarkable, it is nothing in terms of their innovations in finance and logistics. In short, the LTTE wrote the book on terrorist financing. Originally supported by India, the Tigers, turned on their patron in 1987, and since pursued a policy of self-reliance. The “Snow Tigers” under the leadership Tharmalingham Shunmugham aka Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP), have funded themselves through legal and extralegal means and have procurement operatives based in around the world.

The LTTE have used arms dealers in Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Lebanon, Egypt and Cyprus; shopped black markets in former war zones – Cambodia (Thailand), Afghanistan, Mozambique and the former Yugoslavia; and shopped the countries of the former Soviet bloc - Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Ukraine, Slovakia and Kazakstan, as well as North Korea and China. In one famed case, China North Industries Corp (Norinco) sold the LTTE two consignments of assault rifles, light artillery, rockets and ammunition, each large enough to fill a 230-foot cargo ship. The purchases in September 2003 and October 2004 were arranged through a middleman and certified with North Korean “end user” documents. The Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksapersonally appealed to Chinese leaders in Beijing in February 2007 to halt a third consignment. One senior procurement officer arrested had a laptop with spreadsheets detailing more than $13 million in payments in the summer of 2006 for military equipment, including anti-aircraft guns and 100 tons of high explosives. His passport showed more than 100 trips in the past five years to countries such as China, Kenya.

The Tiger’s revenue stream has been estimated to be between $50 to $80 million per year. The money was diversified and invested around the world in money and stock markets through an array of front companies.

The LTTE invest directly or front money for supporters as a terrorist venture capitalist, in freight forwarding, gold and jewelry shops, restaurants, magazines and video sales, stores, bus companies, telephone and computer services. At one time, the Tigers owned and operated 11 merchant ships, flying under the flags of Panama, Honduras and Liberia, repeatedly changing the name of the ships, and manifest details.

More money came from illicit sources, including, racketeering, extortion, drug smuggling, money laundering, gold smuggling, and human smuggling. The LTTE have been behind some of the largest human trafficking rings in the European Union.

Perhaps the single-most important revenue stream is a baseline tax on the 800,000-strong Tamil diaspora, known as the Tamil Tax. They are most active in countries with large diaspora communities, especially, Canada, Switzerland, Australia, UK, US, Scandinavia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Canadian security forces estimated that the LTTE earned $6.5 million from investments in Canada between October 1998 - October 1999. The Canadian intelligence report estimated that Tamil communities in the UK, Canada and Australia, alone, provided $1.5 million per month. In Canada, the tax began as roughly C$1/day per family, though was increased. In the UK it’s roughly £300 per year.

Increasingly the LTTE has been an issue for USA law enforcement. Though proscribed by the US in 1997, there were few enforcements, until after 9/11 when the US took terrorist financing more seriously, and had to target more than just Muslim organizations and individuals for appearance’s sake. Currently, the FBI is investigating a Wall Street financier suspected of donating millions of dollars to the rebels, while an employee of Microsoft was indicted for procuring computers and software for the Tigers. Recently, 8 suspects were arrested in an ATM fraud scandal in NY. In April 2007, the FBI arrested the alleged U.S. director of the Tigers and 11 other LTTE suspects in the New York City region. In Baltimore, “a pair of Indonesian men pled guilty and were sentenced recently for working with others to export surface to air missiles, state-of-the-art firearms, machine guns, and night vision goggles to the Tigers in Sri Lanka.”

On 15 November 2007, the Treasury Department, proscribed the LTTE’s development agency, established after the 26 October 2004 tsunami, the Tamil Relief Organization. “TRO passed off its operations as charitable, when in fact it was raising money for a designated terrorist group responsible for heinous acts of terrorism," said Adam J. Szubin, Director of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). “TRO's efforts worldwide reportedly have allowed the LTTE to use humanitarian aid, which TRO collected from the international community after the December 2004 tsunami, to launch new campaigns to strengthen LTTE military capacity.”

Since the 22 February 2002 Norwegian-backed ceasefire fell apart, and all out war resumed in September 2006, the Tamil’s demise has been surprisingly swift. They are now confined to a small patch of jungle (roughly 35 sq miles) north of Mulitaivu, on the northeastern coast. Why the quick demise? Clearly the thirty years of war wreaked havoc on society, and proved to be a demographic catastrophe. As a result, the LTTE have been forced to rely on child soldiers, limiting their battlefield efficacy. An Amnesty International report estimated that 60 percent of LTTE cadres are under the age of 18 and that 40 percent of LTTE cadres killed in action are between the ages of 9 and 18. While these estimates seem slightly high, there is no doubt that the LTTE had to recruit child combatants to fill their depleted ranks. Second, the Sri Lankan military, never the most apt, had a string of successes. They captured the Tamil city of Jaffna in 1995, then were able to target the LTTE from both the north and the south. Following the 2005 election of the hardline president Mahinda Rajapaksa, the Sri Lankan armed forces increased in size by 40%. Sri Lanka's military now has about 300,000 troops, in a country with a population of just 22 million. Popular support for the government’s war efforts, now that the LTTE is on the ropes, has rarely been higher. The Tamil cities of Killinochi and Mulitaivu fell this year, depriving the LTTE of concentrated populations centers and a base of revenue. Third, the once cohesive LTTE began to fracture. In 2004, Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan, aka Col. Karuna, who controlled the eastern provinces, defected with his forces to the government. Disputes over the inflow of aid following the 2004 tsunami, led to further infighting. As ceasefire violations increased in 2003-06, it was clear that Prabakharan had no intention of giving the ceasefire a chance, angering his war-weary population and rank and file soldiers. In fact, the LTTE had used three previous ceasefires (1985, 1989-90, and 1994-95) as opportunities to regroup and re-arm. Finally, the post-9/11 environment had severe repercussions for LTTE fundraising and weapons procurement. Prabhakaran, himself, acknowledged that the LTTE had been "compelled by unprecedented historical circumstances to participate in [the 2002-04] peace talks with the Sinhalese state," first by the "Indian regional superpower" and "by the pressure of the international community.”

What to expect? There is nothing more ferocious than a cornered tiger. Expect a wave of suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks. While LTTE forces might be cornered, the LTTE has operatives and caches spread out. Desperate times call for desperate measures, including attacks on their own civilian population fleeing the war zone. Expect more attacks on moderate Tamil leaders who seek greater autonomy through legal-parliamentary means. If Prabakharan is captured or killed, the LTTE will be greatly weakened. He is the charismatic leader, the embodiment of the revolution. There is no heir to power with his popular appeal/fear or respect from rank and file.

Finally, the Tigers will regroup, for no other reason than the government’s failings. Despite the defection of Col. Karuna in 2004, the government failed to bring in meaningful development projects and give the Tamil community the degree of political and social autonomy that was promised to them. Sri Lankan military forces act with impunity and have been behind egregious human rights violations. There must be justice as well as transparent government. The government must put in place legal protections for minorities and end the systematic discrimination of the Tamil community. Though Sri Lanka is in a position to win the war, they must not fail to win the peace.

LTTE Withdrawals from Peace Talks

LTTE withdrawals from Peace Talks

• June 11,1990 - Breaks off talks with Ranasinghe Premadasa Government and starts Eelam War two.

• April 19, 1995 - Breaks off talks with Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga Government. Begins Eelam war three by attacking Trincomalee Naval Base.

• April 21, 2003 - Withdraws from peace talks with Ranil Wickremesinghe Government. Continuously violates the CFA.

• December, 2005 - LTTE begins Eelam War four.

Paper Planes

When they flew across Sri Lankan skies over Colombo on the night of 20th Friday [Feb 2009], the self styled terrorist ranks of Tamil Tiger Air Wing may have thought that success was written in gold for their mission. They had taken the small island nation for a free ride, by violating its air space with low flying light planes - mostly below radar detectable height - and gravity bombing hype and mystery. Purpose of their visits has never been benign, but this time the plot was even sinister. Instead of bombing targets off the high security zone and flying away with triumph, this time they pierced right through the Colombo HSZ, possibly targeting a VIP position on a journey of no return. They were attempting a suicide fly by.

Tamil Tigers, also known as LTTE, have brought a number of evil elements to the world. Tamil Tigers are the first to coin the term of “Suicide Bomber”. They have obtained some naval capacity [of the size of fishing trawlers], submersibles and light planes. They introduced internationally organized Credit Card Theft. They have extended the cutting edge of global terrorism to a new height, creating human catastrophes in many parts of Sri Lanka.

And their approaches have been copied fondly by other terror groups, like in the case of countless suicide bombing in Iraq and Pakistan and ambush style terror attack in Mumbai. This time they were trying to set up another chapter in Terrorist’s Cook Book on Kamikaze.

World has reacted to these wings of Satan in different ways. Having publically denounced the evil motto, many people seem to be fond of its operational detail and secretly admire the fiasco. Singers have sung and ethnic migrants have boasted, but world is yet to know that they are adoring a two horned bastard who threatens tomorrow’s aerial safety as a whole.

Like law, diplomacy and religion, terrorist philosophies fly over the country borders. Different terror groups adapt ideologies of one another. Like fashion, terrorist maneuvers are copied. In a world where technology marvels, there is no guarantee that another terror movement will not adapt flying examples of Tamil Tigers of today. It can happen in any place where they have significant cover for the safety of the machines - not only in third world, but also in first world. It is correct that all big nations are protected with significant air defence systems. But it is rather unknown to many that no nation is fully protected from aerial threats. Low flying small planes can get away from many radar systems. Also they can play a drama of benign agenda until they reach the Kamikaze target. This is a threat that world has not yet felt. And they admire the first terrorists to fly.

Of the possibilities, bombing is the least, has anyone calculated what kind of catastrophe they can create by spraying malicious material such as toxic gases, germs or nuke-waste. Tamil Tigers may have plotted all these. Who knows, they might do it tomorrow. It is a paramount responsibility of world as a whole to defeat such movements as soon as possible, before they become a legend and example for other jungle prowling terror masterminds, who mean nothing but doom.

Back to the story – With the approaching city skyscrapers, the terror pilot raised the altitude. At this night hours, crashing into one of the business centers would not cause much damage other than the loss of the flying machine. They needed a better target - perhaps some military establishment, maybe the President’s house or maybe they were looking for a place of public gathering. Tamil Tigers measure triumph in civilian head count – a diminishing habit from even the most uncivilized tribal regions of the world today.

Before we move further on the events unfolded on that decisive night it is important to go through the hype and myth of the air capabilities of Tamil Tigers. Is it a great feat to possess air capability for a terrorist movement? Surely it is one of the first occasions, but given the world order of today, and the volatility on anti-terror policies and foresight in Sri Lankan politics, it is not a magic at all. Let the facts speak.

Tamil Tigers are the wealthiest terrorist movement in the world, ahead of Al Qaeda [funded by millionaire supreme leader Osama Bin Laden], Colombian terrorists [humble cocaine traders], Hisbullah [allegedly funded by oil-rich Arab communities] and Somalian gangs [who mastered sea piracy for million dollar ransom]. They all envy the thick pocket of Velupille Prabhakaran, the elusive leader of Tamil Tigers. Bagging an annual global hat collection of more than USD200 million - mostly extorted from the ethnic Tamil immigrants in west - Tamil Tigers have other unaccounted income sources such as drug selling, human trafficking and credit card theft. Analysts speculate a staggering sum of USD one billion of annual revenue which is comparative to a national GDP of a smaller third world nation. In a world where many millionaires can afford for private jets and helicopters, Tamil Tigers are humbled to possess light planes only. Technically speaking it is a Mafia organization of global scale.

Like Al Qaeda who obtained training to fly Jumbo Jets in US, Tamil Tigers have trained their pilots overseas, hiding within the immigrant community. Apart from the newly trained inexperienced pilots, they seem to have employed mercenaries on bombing.

With wealth, logistics and expertise, they have shown a path for the jubilant terror supporters. It is to fly over anyone’s head and bomb if they do not listen to your demands. And the hype and myth has turned into legend and bandwagon. Ethnic Tamil pop star Methangi Arulprasagam aka MIA sang “Paper Planes” at the time Tamil Tigers acquired the flying capability. Her seemingly innocent song may be a coincidence, but the terror past of her father [Mr Arul Prasagam - former leader known as Arular in Tamil Tiger ranks] and terror bandwagon of her public appearances are not. Even for the song itself, MIA features gunshots in back ground. Following rather interesting segments are extracted from original lyrics.

“Pirate skulls and bones Sticks and stones and weed and bombs Running when we hit 'em Lethal poison through their system”

“Some some some I some I murder Some I some I let go”

MIA is free to express her views. But too many coincidences spawn a whirlpool of speculations. For an example her deceptive voice tells “bombs” in original song which is mostly interpreted as “bongs” elsewhere. Having preserved the freedom of expression, what right do we deserve to promote terrorism at its lethal height of aerial capability? Things to ponder.

The plane lowered between the skyscrapers. Except for one or two stubborn parties, the entire city was in self-inflicted darkness. The Defence Forces were ready from the moment they detected the threat. Many guns were waiting, one plane to fly, they were attempting yet another impossibility.

Inevitable happened at once. It is not clear who took the target. It can be a naval gun ship, a ground AA gun, or a shooter on a high rising building. In a sudden flare of light, the invader vanished into pieces, mostly damaging a government office building. Explosion was rather gigantic. Nevertheless two innocent bystanders paid ultimate price of terrorism while nearly fifty others received injuries, leaving the sadistic Tamil Tiger supporters with something to be happy about.

Moments later another plane was found crashed into an abandoned field near the main airport of the country. Signs of it being hit by AA gunfire were apparent.

Some believe that it is the end of the Tiger air capability. But it is unknown how many hidden sinister planes Tamil Tigers possess. In addition, there is no assurance that they will not acquire any in future, even after being deprived of their territorial control. You can fly a plane from anywhere, be it a neighboring country or mere ocean. And most importantly there is no assurance that other such movements will not adapt the newest weapon on terrorist range. The era invented by Tamil Tigers assures no one - anywhere in the world - free sleep, without the scare of sky falling on you. It is the era of terrorist flying.

In the current phase of this war, Sri Lanka has lived its moments of truth - the valuable proof that it would not kneel in front of the ruthlessness of terrorism. It has proven to all that possessing money and preaching cruelty is not enough for savagery to rule. It has shown the world that on the strict stance of righteousness you can beat any evil force. And by shooting down the air capability of Tamil Tigers they have proven the world that sanity prevails.

Yet the hype continues. MIA will sing Paper Planes for another decade, denying her subtle propaganda and indirectly providing morale jet fuel to the thousands of like sinister incest minds plotting the next big human catastrophe anywhere in the world. Tamil Tigers may not fly again, but the terrorists elsewhere might take up the baton.

But one thing remains assured. They are Paper Planes indeed and they burn very fast.


- Bharana Ganitha -

Human Rights Watch hell-bent on attacking Sri Lankan government

By Chandrani Gunaratna

February 21, 2009: New York-based right organization Human Rights Watch yesterday (19) released yet another report on demanding to stop the "war" on civilians in Sri Lanka. The report quotes James Ross, legal and policy director at HRW as saying "This 'war' against civilians must stop. Sri Lankan forces are shelling hospitals and so-called safe zones and slaughtering the civilians there."

In a way it is comical how Human Rights Watch (HRW) beats the same drum over and over again when clearly there is evidence to show otherwise.

Within the last few days the ICRC and the UN openly accused the LTTE Terrorists shooting and killing the civilians who are trying to flee the murderous grip of LTTE. The UN and ICRC both said shells fell on the Puthukkudiyiruppu hospital but they were not certain who fired them. In one report the UN said shells killed 56 civilians but quietly retracted the report later.

Little by little the aid agencies are beginning to realize who is killing who especially after a suicide bomber blew herself at the IDP registration center in Dharmapuram killing 10 civilians and 19 army personnel who were treating the civilians and after LTTE Terrorists fired at a bus carrying the refugees.

UN on Monday (16) blowing the genocide charges against the government accused the LTTE Terrorists of trying to prevent civilians leaving. UN said the Tigers have shot and sometimes killed a growing number of people trying to leave the war zone. Not only that, the UN charged the Tigers of forcibly recruiting children as young as 14.

Trying to show that the report is unbiased Ross says "With each battlefield defeat, the Tamil Tigers appear to be treating Tamil civilians with increased brutality. They've shot at those trying to flee and stepped up forced recruitment and forced labor."

But then the accusations fly right back at the government attempting to justify the "war" on civilians charge. The report says "The Sri Lankan government has indicated that the ethnic Tamil population trapped in the war zone can be presumed to be siding with the LTTE and treated as combatants, effectively sanctioning unlawful attacks."

The Sri Lankan government repeatedly has said the civilians are of utmost concern and the soldiers are specifically instructed not to fire into the safe zones and also not to fire heavy artillery or mortar into the battle fronts. The soldiers are paying the maximum price with their lives to rescue the civilians trapped in the LTTE controlled area.

In any conflict there are civilians who get hit by the crossfire and the Sri Lankan soldiers are trying their best to handle the Terrorists on one hand and rescue the civilians who are being held as human shields by the Terrorist on the other hand. British medical journal, The Lancet puts the civilian casualties in the US invasion of Iraq at a whopping 655,000 and some accounts cite the figure as high as 1.3 million.

Throwing another fire ball at the government HRW says that "the plight of the civilians has been made worse by the government's decision in September 2008 to order most humanitarian agencies out of the Wanni. Government efforts to bring in food, medical supplies, and other relief - with a minimal role for the United Nations - have been insufficient. Continued fighting, lack of oversight, and the manipulation of the delivery of aid by government forces and the LTTE have all contributed to the continuing humanitarian crisis."

It is very transparent that either HRW is hell bent on attacking the Sri Lankan government or totally ignorant of the current developments in the embattled land.

Last year Sri Lanka government has dispatched nearly 8000 metric tons of essential food items to the displaced civilians in Wanni region. In December of 2008 World Food Program sent 4,120 tons emergency food supplies to an estimated 200,000 IDPs trapped in the region. Just this week the government dispatched two shipments of 40 metric tons of food by the sea route as the roads are heavily mined in the area.

The barrage from HRW doesn't stop yet. It adds another charge.

"Displaced persons in the Wanni who escape to what they hope is safety within government-controlled areas are instead put in internment centers masquerading as "welfare villages" in Vavuniya and nearby locations. The displaced persons, including entire families, detained in these military-controlled, barbed-wire camps are denied their liberty and freedom of movement," Human Rights Watch says.

The legal and policy director continuing the attack says "All civilians who manage to escape the Tamil Tigers are held by the government in squalid military-controlled camps and hospitals with little access to the outside world," said Ross. "The government seems to be trying its best to keep its role in their ordeal away from public scrutiny."

The director seems to be unable to hold LTTE accountable for the plight of the civilians without attacking the government first. He seems to be trying his best to satisfy his organization's paymasters.

Two leading Tamil rights activists, Rajan Hoole and K. Sritharan of the University Teachers for Human Rights (UTHR-Jaffna) in an interview to Indian media said that "Many have had the experience of being shot at by the LTTE as they escaped or (by) the army personnel at the entry points, deliberately provoked by LTTE fire."

In contrast, "generally the behaviour of soldiers at entry points has, in the cases known to us, been exceptionally good," they said.

HRW should get its facts right. Sri Lankan government doesn't wage a war against civilians; it wages a war against a ruthless terrorist organization that killed thousands and thousands of people not just Sinhalese, Muslims, Buddhist monks, world leaders, political leaders but also their own people whom they claim to be representing, their own young children and continue to kill the their kith and kin who wants to find a better life on the other side of the battle lines.

The biased attitude of HRW is certainly not helping to alleviate the suffering of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka. It is even hindering the progress of the resettlement and rehabilitation of the IDPs as foreign governments rely on these lopsided reports to decide on the aids to Sri Lanka. Why HRW is distorting the truth is a question right-minded international community should ask.

UNICEF: More Children Recruited for Fighting by LTTE

UNICEF PRESS RELEASE
More children victims of the conflict, says UNICEF

Colombo, 17 February 2009 – With a growing number of children being recruited by the LTTE and scores of children being killed or injured in fighting, UNICEF today expressed its gravest concerns for children, as Sri Lanka’s conflict enters a new phase.

“We have clear indications that the LTTE has intensified forcible recruitment of civilians and that children as young as 14 years old are now being targeted,” said Mr Philippe Duamelle, UNICEF’s Representative in Sri Lanka. “These children are facing immediate danger and their lives are at great risk. Their recruitment is intolerable.”

From 2003 to the end of 2008, UNICEF has recorded more than 6000 cases of children recruited by the LTTE. “Child soldiers suffer physical abuse, traumatic events and face death. Instead of hope, fear defines their childhood,” said Duamelle.

UNICEF also said it was extremely alarmed at the high number of children being injured in the fighting in the northern area of Sri Lanka known as the Vanni. “Scores of injured children have been evacuated in the past week,” said UNICEF’s Duamelle. “Children are victims of this conflict by being killed, injured, recruited, displaced, separated and denied their every day needs due to the fighting.”

The main injuries to children have been burns, fractures, shrapnel and bullet wounds. UNICEF reiterates the call it has made time and again to Government and the LTTE – civilians, especially children, must be given every protection from the fighting.

UNICEF, together with other UN agencies and partners, is responding to the needs of 30,000 people who have been able to leave the Vanni and are now receiving humanitarian assistance away from the conflict. UNICEF’s emergency support is in water and sanitation, nutrition, protection and education. UNICEF said it is crucial all civilians in the Vanni are able to leave and reach a safe area where they can be urgently assisted.

#####

For further information, please contact:
James Elder, Communication Chief, UNICEF Sri Lanka, Mobile: 94-777416742, Office: 94-11-
2555270 ext 250 jelder@unicef.org

Sarah Crowe, Regional Chief of Communications, UNICEF South Asia
Mobile: +91 9910532314. Office: +91 1124606247 scrowe@unicef.org
Patrick McCormick, UNICEF New York, Tel: + 212 326 7426 e-mail: pmccormick@unicef.org

UN Sri Lanka: LTTE Atrocities Against Trapped Wanni Civilians

United Nations
Office of the Resident / Humanitarian Coordinator
Colombo, Sri Lanka

UN SRI LANKA STATEMENT

COLOMBO, 16 February 2009: The United Nations’ concern for the welfare of the civilian population caught up in the fighting has heightened based on reports received in the last few days. While the designation of the new safe zone has provided some respite for the tens of thousands of civilians trapped for weeks by heavy fighting which has killed and injured many people, reports from yesterday indicate that there was some fighting inside the zone. This fighting led to the deaths and injury to yet more civilians. The United Nations calls for the Sri Lankan forces and the LTTE to refrain from fighting in areas of civilian concentration.

The LTTE continues to actively prevent people leaving, and reports indicate that a growing number of people trying to leave have been shot and sometimes killed. There are indications that children as young as 14 are being recruited into the ranks of the LTTE.

Fifteen United Nations staff and 75 of their dependents, 40 of whom are children, and 35 of whom are women, remain in the same area, having also been prevented from leaving by the LTTE. Fifteen of these children have contracted respiratory diseases, a serious indicator for a population which is now in dire need of humanitarian assistance.

We are acutely aware that the suffering of our own UN staff and dependents is just one part of a much larger picture. However their release would be a good gesture and would strengthen the capacity of the UN to assist the tens of thousands of people both inside the Vanni pocket, and the approximately 30,000 IDPs who have left for government held areas.

Despite their own vulnerable position, many of these staff played an important role in helping with the distribution of 8,400 of tons of food to the civilians of the Vanni over the past four months. We are especially concerned that one staff member was reported forcibly recruited into the LTTE yesterday. The UN calls on the LTTE to immediately release him, to desist from further recruitment of civilians, and to permit passage for people who wish to leave, especially the women and children.

Tens of thousands of civilians remain in the “Vanni Pocket,” including a large number of children. They are experiencing serious shortages of food, medicine, and clean water, and as a result increasing numbers are becoming ill. Efforts to bring in more food and medicines have not yet been successful, and it is imperative that these needs be met.

The UN calls on both sides to find an orderly and humane solution so that civilians – and children in particular - can be spared further bloodshed and loss of life due to both disease and the fighting. End.

United Nations

202-204 Bauddhaloka Mawatha • P.O.Box 1505, Colombo 7, Sri Lanka

Telephone: +94 (1) 583805 • Fax: +94 (1) 581116 or 589691 • Internet: fo.lka@undp.org

LTTE: A Tale of Atrocities

A Graphical Presentation of LTTE: A Tale of Atrocities

Tamil and Sinhala Identities- Their Plausible Origins and Consequences

This is a work in progress in which I have developed preliminary ideas about the evolution of identities which set the background for the racist-ideology of the LTTE. It is however more than that and attempts to understand the evolution of the current identities of the Sinhalas and the Tamils. The references associated with these assertions will be added in time.

Names of Empires of South India are not identified with the language Tamil:

Pandya, Chola, Chera (Chera later developed their own language Malayali, Pandyas controlled South India and Sri Lanka in early times- Sinhala is probably derived from them. Modern Tamil can best be attributed to the Cholas)

Sangam Literature mentions Tamil as a language:

Tolk ã ppiyam (derived from combination of two words- Tonmai meaning ancient and Kappiam meaning literature) is work on grammar. The exact date is not known (poor archaeological evidence) but based on “linguistic evidence” is dated around 1st century BCE. It is said to have been based on Sanskrit grammar.
A “scientific breakthrough” was achieved in analysing the syllables and classifying the alphabet into vowels and consonants.

The term Sangam derives from the Buddhist Sangha (South India was under the control of Buddhist Kings the Kalabras (not Tamil). Dravida Sangha was established by a Jain named Vajranandi. This influenced interest in the Tamil language and literature.
The prePallava literature does not mention Sangam academies. Thus it is likely that these academies occurred much later than the time attributed to them (in BCE).

This is not to say that the the literature associated with Sangam were not present in the period 200BCE to 300 CE, but it is likely to have been orally transmitted and probably could not have been identified as “Tamil” as such.
It should be kept in mind that South India was largely megalithic until well into the first Millenium. Anuradhapura was the largest city in the south comparable to two northern Indian cities. Thus it is more likely that Prakrit evolved more in northern Sri Lanka than in Southern India.

Tamilakam
Some authors are of the opinion that Tamilakam (Tamil country) did not exist archaeologically. The people of South India appear to have been loosely associated and linked by the similarity of the proto-tamil language that they used. The Sangam literature classifies clans of people based on the type of occupation and where they live.

On the other hand two Chinese monks in the early centuries of the Common Era (CE) have mentioned the island of the lion people (Sinhale).

The earliest archaeological evidence connecting sangams with the city of Madurai is the Cinnamanur inscription of the Pandyas (10 th century).

The word Tamil
Tolk ã ppiyam while being dated to the 1st century BC may have been a generic grammar for a number of southern languages and not necessarily for Tamil.

The word for Tamil occurs in Tolk ã ppiyam in the form of senthamil (classical) and kotunthamil (colloquial). Sinhala grammar for example follows similar principles and unlike Tamil had acquired Sanskrit forms in its alphabet as well (same as Malayalam).
The etymological roots of “tamila” or “Tamiza” could be traced to give similar meanings (one’s own tongue) similar to Siyabasa of the sinhalas.

Dravida vs. Damila
It is likely that the words used in Mahavamsa (Sinhala cronicles) for Tamil, Damida and Damila were pointing to the sinhalese identifying an ethnic subgroup in ancient Sri Lanka. These words probably equate to Dravida Sangha as created by the Buddhist Jains and possibly the Tamil language perhaps generated with the Tolk ã ppiyam. I would suggest that the Cholas who build a magnificent empire were responsible for the development of Tolk ã ppiyam and identification of the language Tamil. It is interesting that neither the Cholas nor the Cheras called their language after their identity. The Pandyan language is extinct except perhaps for the Sinhala, which is identified with the identity of the island and people of Sinhale.
The Tamil Country and identity was never a united concept until the advent of the Chola empire (Chalukya Chola). This only lasted for a brief period but spread to most of Sri Lanka and to most of South east Asia. It is likely that the Chola suppression of Buddhism (even though at one point they protected it) in favour of Saivism for the hundred or so years of their rule over much of Lanka l(9-10 century CE) left an indelible imprint in the consciousness of the Singhalese that Tamil speakers could do it again.

Sinhala
There are claims that the Sinhala was not a language until the 12th century and that there was no sinhala identity until then. However, there are others who refute this based on the vast historical evidence (both linguistic and archaeological) of such an identity. One such argument is the inscription left by the Chinese invaders of about this period which included Chinese, Pali (Chinese were Buddhists) and Tamil (Tamil was by this time the maritime language of the region thanks to the Chola empire) but not Sinhala.
The evolution of South Asian and South east Asian language scripts from Brahmi demonstrates that Sinhala and Tamil script evolved in parallel (although sinhala-prakrit was probably commenced its evolution at an earlier stage) and had reached a mature stage by the time of the Chola empire.
Sinhala folk oral tradition of the Middle Ages which has been committed to writing demonstrates a very strong identity at least in this period (to the exclusion of other identities). It could be extrapolated based on Mahavamsa which was written in pali by Mahanama Thera in the 6th century CE (based again on much older oral tradition) that such an identity (Sinhala) existed for much longer. There is no indication of significant identification of Tamil as a major enemy in the Mahvamsa period. The hostility of Sinhalas towards foreigners (including Europeans and Chola Tamils) may have emerged in the context of almost continuous attempts at suppression of Buddhism by invaders since the Cholas. The Sinhala mind set which appears to have developed a character of being under siege, in the 19th and 20th century may have one explanation in this historical feature.
Sinhala identity was certainly well formed by the time of the English occupation. Some of the proponents of Tamil homeland concept point out that the Kandyan treaty was signed in tamil and malayali as well as sinhala as evidence of a divided nation (in fact there is speculation to suggest that Mahanilame, Ehalepola signed in Tamil to indicate that it was signed under duress ; to abrogate later; when making a more emotionally significant plead on behalf of family he signed in sinhala). However, the much more likely explanation is that despite language differences people were united under the sinhala flag and nation.

The Origin of Tamil as a nationalistic identity
So far in this exploration I have found no evidence of a unique and continuous “Tamil” identity, which incorporated a language, a country and a people. Language as distinct and written does not appear until the Chola empire and the Demeda and Damila identity as an ethnic grouping has only been recognised in Sri Lankan rock edicts earlier.
The earliest development of Thamilakam (Tamil Country) as a concept incorporating a people, a territory and language which I can find is in the 19th century when some Sri Lankan (Jaffna) elite collaborated with Indians in the Madras Presidency to evolve the idea of a Dravidastan.
Arumuga Navalar (1822-1879) a high caste Jaffna Tamil appear to have made the first attempts at spreading tamil consciousness in Jaffna and South India. He was a crucial player in re-establishing the Shiva agamic faith and Tamil literacy in South India and Jaffna. He and his followers established the society for preservation of Shaivism and the Jaffna Hindu college by the end of the 19th century. It was he who influenced the Governor of Ceylon to appoint Ponnambalam Ramanathan to the legislature.
Another important figure was Thamothran Pillai, the first Jaffna Tamil to graduate from Madras University in 1858. He was greatly influenced by Bishop Robert Caldwell’s (1856)division of languages in India into Indo-Aryan and Dravidian. This appears to have been seminal in the commencement of Dravidian and Tamil consciousness in India and Sri Lanka.
Subsequently Pillai, Virasoiyam and Kalitokai brought out publications on Tamil Classics. It is said that the modern linguistic consciousness of Tamils people can be traced to this period. One Tamil scholar even considered Tamil (language) as Goddess.

Subsequent movements for an independent Dravidastan from these beginnings is not clear but I would postulate that the Jaffna Tamil elites mainly identifying themselves with the Chola Ksyatriya invaders were conscious of their “elite status” and expected to be political leaders of at least Lanka if not the subcontinent. The attempts at secession may have been in recognition that they could not hold such leading positions without complete hegemony over a territory.
The idea of Dravidastan was finally laid to rest with the India-China war (1962) and legislation banning secession. In 1969 Madras State was reconstituted and the Tamilnadu state was born, completing the Tamil Identity.
Thus Tamil identity with a territory and a people and a language appears to be a relatively modern concept in comparison to Sinhala identity. The divisions such Caldwell’s led to dividing the people of India and Sri Lanka along the Aryan-Dravidian divide, whereas modern genetics demonstrate that people of the subcontinent are essentially genetically indigenous and mixed (thus the race theory is artificial). Thus the Sinhale which was the name for the people of the island became an ethnic entity for the first time.
While the Tamils of India had an identity, this left the elite Tamils of Sri Lanka without the political benefits of this. The communication ascribed to the Ponnambalam brothers (elites who appear to have thought they were the heirs to Sri Lankan rule), Chelvanayagam (a Tamil brought up in Malaysia with no loyalty to Sri Lanka) and Amithralingam (the only ordinary son of the soil ) indicate that they wanted the Tamils of Sri lanka to remain an elite section of society.

Death toll at LTTE village massacre counts 14, 9 others including children injured - Karametiya [corrected version]

According to finalized reports the death toll at the LTTE village massacre at Karametiya has risen to 14 civilians, while 9 others including children had sustained serious injuries on Saturday (Feb 21).

A group of LTTE terrorists stormed into the Karametiya village at Rathmalgaha Ella in Iginiyagala yesterday, opening indiscriminate small arms fire at civilians who were mainly Chena cultivators, Iginiyagala Police said. The Karametiya village is a predominantly Sinhalese village, located along the Bibila - Ampara main road. The injured civilians were evacuated to the general hospital at Ampara while Army, Police Special Task Force (STF) personnel are continuing with cordon and search operations to clamp on the perpetrators.

LTTE terrorists committed the brutal village massacre within 24 hours after losing two of its stunt aircraft due to precision air defence fire at Colombo and Katunayake on Friday (20).

LTTE is a ruthless terrorist outfit that has been fighting for a mono ethnic separate homeland for Tamils since 1983. The outfit led by its psychopathic leader V. Prbhakaran is notorious for crimes against women and children. During its three decades of terror campaign against Sri Lankan citizens the outfit has killed and maimed over tens and thousands innocent children in ethnic cleansing raids, indiscriminate bomb attacks and by using child soldiers at the battlefronts. More information will follow.

Tamil Racism is the Kami-kaze of Tamil Federalist Politics

By Sebastian Rasalingam, Toronto
February 22, Toronto, Sri Lanka Guardian

When the first tiger plane appeared in the Sri Lankan skies two weeks after the Ides of March, 2007, client intellectuals of the LTTE cooed glowingly and applauded the "innovative engineering skills" of the emerging Eelam. Kumar David, an engineering professor whose vain effort has been to engineer the "permanent revolution", wrote in the Tamilnet extolling the innovative engineering that had gone into it.

When I, a non-technical old fogie inquired from my more tech-savvy grand children, the facts seems to be quite the opposite. Apparently, one can buy kits for less than the cost of a motor bicycle, together with instructions on how to fit them together. Dime a dozen magazines like "Popular science", "Popular mechanics" etc. discuss these hobby kits all the time It seems that undergraduate students have small hobby clubs where they assemble such planes for fun, during the Canadian summer holidays. So then, why did this Professor Kumar David rush to extol the adaptation of these hobby planes into weapons of terror and suicide?

Kumar David is arch-typical of the lost intellectuals of the Colombo set. They read and write for the benefit of self-anointed "cosmopolitan people" of Sri Lankan extraction who are actually "Scotch" by absorption. Their biggest horror is being bed fellows of the "Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinists" (SBCs). These SBCs were the people who took control of government in 1956, and whose regime was threatened from three sides. First of all there was the Sydney Soyza-Jungle Dissnayake-Anghie types, representing the right-wing Christian groups who felt that the country had "gone to the dogs". Then there were the Marxist elders of the Kumar David types, thinking that the SBCs are like the Menshevik government that proceeded the "Great October Revolution" of Lenin. The great dialectical sages argued that "according to Historical materialism", it is the turn of the "true revolutionary left" to come to power next, displacing the SBCs. The third force was the Tamil Sovereignty lobby, led by Samuel J.V. Chelvanayagam, E.M.V. Naganathan and others who had belonged to the Christianized governing classes of the Tamils.

Today we see Kumar David, Wickramabahu Karunaratna, Vasudeva Nanayakkara and other left-over stumps of the old left become clients and fellow travelers of the LTTE. How did this happen? How can so called "word revolutionaries" who do not even recognize national boundaries gradually come to support a racist, fascist outfit and even accept the territorial claims of the Eelamists? Why does Wickramabahu K go to Kundasle with Ranil Wickremasinghe to say that Sinhala youth are dying in a "land which is not theirs". These Marxists differ from the "Sinhala" Marxists of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) because they do not have any links with the majority, but are themselves a minority, largely coming from the English educated scotch loving community. Many journalists like Tissaranee Gunasekera, "Shanie" etc., belong to this culture. They are still fighting the battle they began in 1956 against the "Sinhala Buddhists". Hence they see the LTTE as natural allies .

It should be emphasized that a good section of the English educated Tamils were NOT racists, but cosmopolitan individuals who had middle-of-the-road liberal views. There were also many English educated Sinhalese who held similar liberal views. Politicians like the Senanayakes, Arunachalam Mahadevas, civil servants like the Kanagasundarams, and their immediate kith and kin were probably in that class. Also, one can say that the middle and lower classes among the Sinhalese, as well as among the Tamils, were people who were tolerant individuals, NOT bitten by the scourge of racism which was at the root of the "Arasu katchchi" campaign of Chelvanayagam et al.

The racist program of the Arasu Kadchi had, already in 1949, stated an exclusive claim to the North and East of Sri Lanka as "traditional homelands" of the Tamils. Even though the name "Tamil", "Dameda", or "Dravida", had not even been used until about the "cankam period", circa 1st century CE,, the Arasu Kadchi writers claimed that the "original inhabitants" of Sri Lanka prior to the arrival of Vijaya were Tamils. Thus Ravana was claimed to be a Tamil king, and Kuveni was conscripted as a Tamil princes deceived and discriminated by Vijaya, the first Sinhala. The stage was set for the "struggle" to drive out the Sinhalese, the Muslims and other "invaders" from "The Tamil homeland".

The British historian Jane Russell states that "Ceylon Tamils had no written document on the lines of the Mahawamsa to authenticate their singular and separate historical authority,... a fact which (they) found very irksome". The many stone inscriptions and Buddhist ruins attesting to this irksome history were also very inconvenient. Thus arose the early campaigns of G. G. Ponnambalam against the "mahavamsa mindset", which later developed into the extensive
territorial claims regarding which K.M. de Silva says "in less than a decade of its enunciation in 1949, [this] theory became an indispensable and integral part of the political ideology of the Tamil advocates of regional autonomy and separatism".

Victor Karunairajan, certainly a cultured Tamil who is clearly no supporter of violence, writing in the Sri Lanka Guardian (Link ) on the 3rd of February 2009, discusses the French-English problems of Canada as a prelude to discussing the ethnic problems of Sri lanka. Karunairajan wants to "recognize three primary stratifications in the ancient order of the Kotte, Kandy and Jaffna kingdoms in a political structure with considerable powers vested in the central government to ensure this evolves progressively into a proper federal state over a period of time". Other writers often quote the discredited "Cleghorn minute" of the 18th century to justify and validate the idea of a Tamil nation. Should we then, at the same time attempt to rectify the deep malaise of the Quebec separatists who have even refused a re-enactment of the battle of the Plains of Abraham? Should we revert to the French, English, Spanish possessions of the Americas that prevailed in 1759 CE? In the same vein, should we return to the political boundaries that prevailed in Europe within the old order of Metternich, to appease the Austrian nationalists and the Hapsburg loyalists?

Political solutions have to be built on existing realities and NOT on what existed at the time of the arrival of Chandrabhanu, Chankilli, Cleghorn or even Brownrig.

Just as there were Kingdoms of Kotte, Kandy and Jaffna in the 15th century, there were also even more important divisions into caste enclaves at that time. Are we to recognize those hierarchical structures as well? Where do we draw the line? The need to legislate the caste system into the constitution was held to be paramount by a number of prominent Tamil leaders including Ponnambalam Ramanathan who led delegations to London on that very issue. Did not this question come up even in front of Soulbury who found the very idea repugnant? If Tamil leaders could, as recently as Vadukkoddei-1976 embrace the concept of a mono-ethnic, racially exclusive Tamil Eelam whose logic is exactly the same as the Afrikaanar-Apartheid idea of separation of races, anything can happen. In fact, a recent e-mail letter circulated under the hand of "son of Eros" argued for an Eelam where the traditional concepts derived from the Law of Manu should be imposed! However, I believe that just as the issue of enshrining caste in the constitution has more or less disappeared today, the need to institutionalize the ethnic divide (and there by buttress the divide) would also disappear within one generation. Here we should note that the division between the Kandyan Sinhalese and the low-country Sinhalese has virtually healed, although this too was thought to need a "federal solution".

Victor K, as well as Ms Sharma, a "student" of Satchi Sithananthan have also taken up a defense of Federalism and argued that federalism is in no way a racist option. Indeed, this is entirely correct if taken "tabla rasa", i.e., free of context. But unfortunately, this is NOT the case in Sri Lanka where federalism was merely the English language masquerade of the Eelam objective of the Arasu lobby. This objective of the Arasu Kadchchi, and the roots of the "Tamil-nation mindset" had been identified by historians like K. M. de Silva and political scientists like A. J. Wilson (see the discussion by Michael Roberts, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol.XXVII, no.1, April 2004).

Initially, this "Tamil-Nation mindset" had no fuel to fire upon. The moderate Tamils did not take the Arasu Kadchchi seriously, while the Singhalese thought of them as a "fringe group". In 1956 the "Sinhala-Buddhist" ground-swell came up with the Sinhala-only cry and provided Chelvanayagam with the fire that he had been waiting for. The "sathyagarahas", "civil disobedience movements", tar-brushing of Sinhala street names etc., taunted the Sinhala majority and produced the violence and "state terror" that the separatists actually called for. The Chelva-Banda pacts were NOT trusted by both sides of the ethnic divide, while they were hailed as the right thing by the English educated urban set who could not read Tamil and had no knowledge of the clearly Eelamist program of the Arasu Kadchchi. Thus the polarization of the nation into two warring factions, gored into increasing frenzy at each race riot, was well on its way. Even the 1983 Black July riots were provoked by the Tamils AND certain sections of the Jayawardene government who probably thought that the Tamils can be "cowed down by suitable intimidation".

It is in this context that the word "federalism", as applied to Sri Lankan politics, has become a corrupt cover for Eelam. In fact it is even worse. One has to only read S. Makenthiran, (I believe an accountant turned political commentator) who writes in the 19th February issue of the Sri Lanka Guardian (Link) to see that Tamil chauvinism is inexhaustible. Just as Chelvanayagam labeled Ponnambalam a "traitor", Makenthiran labels Ananadasangaree a "traitor". If Chelva and Ponna had lived a few more years, they too would have been labeled traitors by the LTTE. While the Sri Lankan government issues stamps commemorating these individuals, the LTTE stamps them out! The racist, fascist nature of Makenthiran's writing is evident. Sentences like "Tamil Nadu Tamils have come out in full support of their Eelam Tamil brethren. Blood is thicker than water" etc., show the level of jingoism, self-deception and deviation from reality that is possible. The Eelam supporters are now hoping for a "federal solution" with India as the central government. That is, they envisage separation from Sri Lanka and annexation to India. I think neither Victor K, nor Renuka Sharma thought of "Tamil federalism" as a process leading to joining up with India because "blood is thicker than water". But that is the Sri Lankan reality of "federalism".

The argument that "blood is thicker than water" is just a racist idiom. In Sri Lanka's context, it is not even biologically true. Most of the Tamils in the Vanni who are considered to be Tamils today were the sinhalese who were thrown out of the Jaffna peninsula by Chankili. Names like Balasingham with the "sinha" ending, do not occur in Tamil Nadu. Such matters have been discussed by Modern sociologists as well as Swami Rasanayagam (Ancient Jaffna), and also K. Vellupillai (Yalpana Vaibhava Kaumudi). Many low-country sinhalese are descendants of the Kauvravas and other Dravidian groups. However, today they may be fiercely sinhala chauvinist, just as Makenthiran is fiercely Tamil chauvinist. So the nearest kin of the Tamils are actually the Sinhalese. Here Vicotr K has correctly pointed out that right through the ages, the Indians have used the Tamils of Lanka as pawns of their political objectives.

Today we have the chance of entirely getting rid of an armed fascist war lord who has traumatized Tamil society. Being a Tamil is a cultural thing and NOT an issue of genes or blood. We value our language, literature and our way of life. I have lived in Jaffna, Mannar, Hatton and Colombo. I found the enriching experience of multi-cultural life in Hatton and Colombo, and found that for the first time, caste and other prejudices did not really matter, unlike in our Tamil society "Race" is nothing but a bigger label similar to the caste labels of earlier times. Federalism based on racial criteria will fail in Sri Lanka.

Interview with Ragavan, LTTE co-founder, on Tamil Militancy (Early Years): Role of Caste and Hitlerian views

By Ahilan Kadirgamar , February 16, 2009
http://kafila.org/2009/02/16/interview-with-ragavan-on-tamil- militancy-part-i/

In a revealing interview tracing the origins of Tamil nationalism and militancy, Ahilan Kadirgamar speaks to C. Rajeshkumar alias Ragavan — a founder member of the LTTE — about the early years. Ragavan left the Tigers in 1984 and has since lived in exile in London. Ahilan, a contributor to Lakbimanews, offered this interview originally published on the web, for publication in this newspaper.

As the Tamil community in Lanka is at the crossroads with twenty five years of war nearing an end with the increasing marginalization of the LTTE, I would like to do a series of interviews on the social, economic and political conditions that led to the emergence of armed politics and militarization of the Tamil community. Returning to those years in the seventies and early eighties then is an attempt to also think about ways forward out of the militarized and armed politics of the last few decades. I intend to do a series of interviews to capture that important political period for Lankan Tamils. This important shift in Lankan politics and the decades of war that followed it did irreparable damage to the Lankan Tamil community and all the peoples of Lanka.

I begin with an interview of Ragavan, a founding member of the LTTE, who left the movement in 1984 and has since moved to London where he lives in exile. In this first interview, Ragavan speaks about his background and early years of militancy.

This is an interview by Ahilan Kadirgamar of Ragavan at his London home on 25 January 2009.

AK: Given the current political moment where we could be ending a cycle of a different form of political engagement by the Tamil community, where politics was very much militarized, I am interested in speaking to your generation in particular. I would like to hear your thoughts on the formation of Tamil militancy in the 1970s and 1980s; the social, economic and political conditions that led to the emergence of a very different kind of politics from Tamil politics during the previous century. I want to begin by asking you a biographical question, about your own background.

R: I should start by saying that I am looking at the past through the present. My knowledge and experiences have been different, and I may have answered your questions very differently if you had asked me the same questions in the seventies.

The seventies were the time of economic changes as well. The import-substitution economy was implemented by the Sri Lankan government at that time. There was an uprising in the South with the JVP, due to the disgruntlement of the Southern youth. That also perhaps had an impact on us. The state was unable to address the growing unemployment crisis at that time. Due to the disenchantment of the Southern youth, the state introduced a standardization scheme, which stated that Tamils should get higher marks to get into the university. In a post colonial setup, without a vibrant economy and a strong national bourgeoisie, the job opportunities were limited and there was much competition to gain employment in the state sector and the growing middle classes competed for state jobs. Entering university to become a doctor, engineer or getting a job in a bank and other state departments were the few options available for the middle class to climb the social ladder. Until 1970, Sri Lanka mainly relied upon exporting raw materials such as tea and rubber and the prices were determined by the world market. The growing oil prices in the 1970’s further affected the third world countries. The newly formed United Front government in 1970 consisted of the SLFP, CP and LSSP which introduced the import substitution economy. I would say that it was ideologically a nationalist project with a socialist tint.

However, the United Front government faced serious economic and political crisis due to the global economic crisis. After they crushed the JVP uprising in the south, the state introduced standardisation policy in order to satisfy the unemployed Sinhala middle class in the South. In a sense, it mainly impacted the Tamil middle class youth particularly from Jaffna and the Sinhala middle class youth in Colombo, with respect to university admissions. The Tamil middle class youth, especially from Jaffna perceived this as an act against Tamils… Tamils from the East, Mannar, Vanni or upcountry were not bothered about the standardisation policy. Students from those areas were rarely admitted to the universities at that time. The standardisation policy, which affected Jaffna Tamil middle class students, was the main catalyst for the militancy. Although the Sri Lankan state disenfranchised Up-Country Tamils in the past and there were colonisation programs in the east, the Jaffna middle class Tamils did not take those issues to form a ‘Tamilness’ or to fight for the rights of Tamils. Secondly, although the Tamil United Front (TUF) started talking about Tamil rights and the federal set up and so on, at that time in the early seventies, they had not started talking about a separate state. However, there was another organization at that time called the Suyaatchi Kazhaagam (Self-rule Forum), under the leadership of V. Navaratnam, who propagated the idea of a Tamil nation.

Firstly, the Tamil youth, particularly the educated Tamil youth, took up this idea of a Tamil nation after the introduction of standardisation. However, their social composition was Tamil middle class, and upper caste as well, that is the university aged youth and Advanced Level students. These students took up this cause and there was a major protest in Jaffna against standardisation in 1970. I was a student at that time and I remember going to the protest march. It was a reasonably peaceful march in which thousands of students from 8th Standard to University participated, and it was organized by the Maanavar Peravai (Student Front) led by Sathiyaseelan. I can recollect some of the slogans which claimed that Tamils were a great educated people. For example, people shouted whether Baddiuddin Mohammed (Education Minister) knew “Alpha Beta” implying that the Tamils are great mathematicians but that this Minister did not know mathematics. It also had an anti-Muslim character in the way they attacked Baddiuddin Mohammed. At that time, I was not fully aware of the nuances of such rhetoric. One year later the government changed its standardisation policy and introduced district quotas and as a result, students from the underdeveloped villages were able to enter the university. However, the Jaffna Tamil middle classes did not want to acknowledge this, as this was against their own interests.

The violence started from there as well, where the armed movements’ goal was to kill the traitors; those who were working with the State. So, there were three attempted assassinations, where, Duraippa was the primary target.

AK: Stepping back a bit, your own family background, did that have any impact on your affinity towards Tamil nationalism at that time?

R: As with any Jaffna Tamil middle class family, their aim was to educate their children and make them a doctor or engineer, there was a production line mentality. At least one child, the elder child, should try and become a doctor, an engineer or at the least an accountant. Due to the lack of resources or social limitations, that was the only goal. There is a proverb in Tamil, “Kolzii meinthallum govermentil meikavendum” (even if you are going to have a chicken farm, you should do it for the government), that was the middle class aim, and had become the Jaffna Tamil mentality. Next there was the family structure, with the authoritarian father figure, and I wanted to leave the family soon. You cant question the father. And I also had a rebellious character and I wanted to leave the family as soon as possible, even before I joined the LTTE, I wanted to leave the house. I was even thinking of getting a job after I passed my O’levels. During this time I was inspired by Tamil nationalist ideology and began to read papers such as ‘Suthanthiran’ and ‘Viduthalai’. When I was a student at Central College, I would go to the Jaffna Library which was close by and read the news papers, particularly ‘Viduthalai’ (Freedom) inspired by the idea of nationalism.

AK: In your formative years, how did the issues of class and caste play out in your local community? Were you conscious of such issues at that time?

R: I was very conscious of caste at an early age. My village, Punallaikatuvan, which was divided into various areas, and Punallaikatuvan did not have one identity, there was the North side and South side of the village and marriage customs were different and restricted. So when I was quite young, there was a man called Thuraisingam, an upper caste man and a Chandiyan (a local village thug), my mother told me that he murdered a man long ago. He also owned land and the Dalits were the service caste and they would work for him. At that time I was about six or seven years old, in the early 60’s, and one day, there was some problem with the Dalits, possibly because they didn’t want to work as he hadn’t paid them properly. The outcome was that the entire Dalit community was chased away from my village. If you look at our recent history, it is like the manner in which the Northern Muslims were chased away. So, all the Dalits were chased away from my village and their belongings were taken away by the Chandian and his followers. And it took them a long time before they could come back and resettle. No one challenged that eviction at that time and that had a lasting impact on me even though I was also from a Vellala middle class family. In a certain sense the Tamil nationalist ideology claimed that all Tamils should be united, and while we did not think about the caste contradictions at that time, we nevertheless thought that everyone should join the struggle without considering the structural inequalities and the caste hierarchy

In the seventies, while it was already in law, the government of Sri Lanka attempted to implement equal access for Dalits in temples and public places. Temple entry in my village was out of the question, as no one was willing to challenge it because of the strength of the caste system. I remember going to a barber saloon (barbers belonged to the oppressed castes), when I was small, and asking the barber if he will allow Dalits into his saloon. There was a big muscular farmer standing next to me and he slapped me, because he was angry that I would even ask such a question. Ultimately, the barber saloon was closed, as the barber was scared of the upper castes. And after the saloon was closed, the barber started visiting people’s houses and performing his work. So, particularly in the villages, the caste system was very strong. With the service castes at that time, there was no question of workers rights, whether you were paid or not, you were expected to work.

At the same time, then in the seventies, there was no strong sense of Tamil identity; the village identity and caste identity were much stronger than Tamil nationalist identity. I believe that it is still the case; as in practice the cultural and religious festivals are caste orientated and the identity is preserved. Although Tamil identity in a sense is there, it is the outer layer, rather than the substance of the Tamil community. The social practices such as festivals, marriage and death are arranged according to the caste and village hierarchy and what you practice is what you are. And although Communist parties in the north at that time talked about class, there was no real working class formation at that time, and only a few factories, like the cement factory, so I would say class was subsumed under caste. While there might have been class divisions, there wasn’t a strong class consciousness, where as caste consciousness was very strong. So, class was seen through caste, with caste more dominant than class. Even a worker from the upper caste would not allow a Dalit to marry his daughter or to even allow him inside his house. I would say that when the Chinese Communist Party took up temple entry, caste took a prominent role, and the caste issue was dominant even though the Communist Party interpreted it in class terms. Without the elimination of the caste system, I believe that class unity is not possible

The other important factor was the independence and formation of Bangladesh. India’s role was admired by the Jaffna Tamil community, and many politicians began referring to India as the motherland.

AK: Moving onto the Tamil political formations at that time. Particularly the dominant role of the Federal Party, how did that influence youth like you?

R: Although the Federal Party was talking about Tamil nationalism, they did not have any organized program. They did not even have a committee or village level organizational structure. What they would do is, come every now and then, and say this is our agenda. Even at that time, the Federal Party did not create the democratic political space, because there was no political participation by the people in the organisation. I would say the Federal Party just made decisions at the top, and was merely passed down. I often compare the difference with the DMK in India, while I don’t agree with DMK’s politics, they did have a strong organizational structure; there are committees at the village level, there are different layers of organizational structures. The Federal Party did not have that, and may be they would have one person in each village, and the Federal Party Member of Parliament will come and talk to him, and he will arrange a meeting once in a blue moon. So, the democratic space or democratic culture was not there. I am exclusively talking about Jaffna society at the moment. Anyway, neither did we have the democratic culture, there was the repressive character of the caste system, so the democratic mindset was also lacking. So, everything from caste to the family, it was a hierarchical structure and the hierarchical system was designed in such a way to obey the order than to discuss or criticise. I believe that the LTTE’s political ideology reflected the Jaffna Tamil middle class and upper caste interests and their pride while its authoritarian structure stemmed from the family and caste hierarchical system. So while we are talking about the need for democratic culture at the current moment, I would say we did not have it at that time either. Electoral democracy was there, but not a democratic culture, and even grassroots civil society organizations did not exist. There were only the state structures.

AK: What was the politics that came down in this top down manner from the Federal Party and the Tamil Congress, and how did it impact your politics?

R: Tamil Congress was seen as a Colombo based party for the elite. But the Federal Party was seen as a party of the Tamil people. At that time, people would say that G. G. Ponnambalam was great orator and a lawyer. In those days, the issue was about who is clever. They would say Chelvanayagam (leader of the Federal Party) is only a civil lawyer where as Ponnambalam has been to the UN. People would argue about such matters. I can still remember, the symbol of the Tamil Congress was the bicycle, where as the symbol of the Federal Party was the house, and people would argue about that as well. What is the use of the cycle, but the house you can live in it. (Laughter…) These arguments were about who you should vote for and not about Tamil rights. But after a while the Federal Party and then the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) played an important role in the rise of Tamil nationalism, particularly in the seventies.

I can say this, that the ruling government in the South had a vision about non-alignment and interest in nationalisation in opposition to the legacy of British colonial influence. So there was a progressive content to it. But unfortunately, it was mobilized as part of Sinhala nationalism and not as a Lankan nationalist consciousness. Instead of challenging the Sinhala nationalist ideology, the Federal Party was opposed to nationalisation; for example, the nationalisation of the Trincomalee Harbour under the control of the British.

Next, the Federal party or then the TULF did not have a political programme to continue a sustained campaign such as the civil disobedience movement in India or the civil rights movement in the USA. I believe that the TULF disseminated Tamil nationalist ideology without realising the consequences as their main goal was to win seats in parliament. Although they addressed these issues in the parliament, when the state failed to address the grievances, the leadership did not have any alternatives but to talk about Bangladesh and mother India. Tamil rights or minority rights could have been fought politically with a sustained civil rights campaign. Due to the lack of political commitment from the TULF leadership a political gap was created and inexperienced adventurous middle class youths took up the role to file the gap, which in turn created Tamil militancy. I believe that the rights of Tamils or other minorities should have been fought democratically and the TULF should have taken a lead role. My contention is that, in the context of Sri Lanka, it is a folly to describe the struggle of the rights of minorities as a national liberation struggle. However, in a colonial setting you may call it a national liberation struggle. In our case, there was ample space to fight for the rights of minorities within the democratic terrain and this was not done.

Now, if you take district quotas in education introduced by the government in 1972 instead of standardisation, that was not seen as a progressive step. Particularly the Federal Party leadership did not see this as empowering the youth from the rural areas. On the other hand, perhaps the Federal Party was concerned only about the Jaffna Tamil middle class upper caste youth, even if it might help Tamils in other areas. The nationalisation policies of the State were also seen as anti Tamil by the Federal Party and the TULF.

AK: Expanding more on Tamil nationalism in the 1970s, you mentioned how “traitors” were constructed and targeted, and you mentioned the idea of the Tamil nation that began to emerge. What other concepts became important and was the Federal Party actively cultivating and pushing these concepts?

R: Maanavar Peravai (Student Federation) led by Sathiyaseelan was formed in order to oppose the standardisation policy. Tamil nationalist ideology was also part of the program of the Maanavar Peravai. Although, there was no direct link between it and the Federal Party, it was a separate formation, but ideologically they shared the same view. Whoever was opposed to the Federal Party and later the TULF, the TULF would claim that they are traitors, and that they should not die naturally, so that kind of rhetoric seems to have tacitly encouraged violence. And the Maanavar Peravai was working actively to eliminate such traitors.

The Sri Lankan government also made a blunder when they introduced the Republican constitution of 1972, where Buddhism was given a prominent role. So, in addition to standardisation, these issues also contributed to the formation of a Tamil national identity.

AK: Was the State identified with the Sinhala community?

R: It is a complex issue. Of course the ruling class from the Sinhala community constructed Sinhala nationalism. However, whether the State identified with the Sinhala community is questionable as the Sinhala community is not a monolithic whole. The caste, class and regional differences were there. However a certain social class consisting of the Sinhala middle class and the Bikkus (Buddhist clergy) were able to disseminate Sinhala nationalist ideology and was able to consolidate power. We should not forget that the same State killed more than 70,000 Sinhala youths in the insurrections of the 70s and 80s. Therefore to answer your question, the State identified with Sinhala nationalism but not with Sinhala community.

I would say the Tamil nationalist ideology became a mirror image of the Sinhala nationalist ideology and there emerged a Tamil versus Sinhala framing. The Tamil nationalist leadership instead of challenging Sinhala nationalism and its ideological and political content, inverted the same ideological framework and started its political campaign from the same premises. Racist slogans and rhetoric were liberally used by both Sinhala and Tamil nationalists. Dutugemunu Ellara episode to King Changilian and Pandaravanniyan’s epics were reinterpreted, constructed and used for a modern nationalist construction.

I should tell you this story. My father was transferred to Mannar and my father wanted me to come to Mannar as he was aware that I was involved with militant groups. I went to Mannar and joined a Catholic college named St Xavier College. After a few months, there was a drama about Changilian, and until then I knew Changilian as the last Tamil king who heroically fought against the Portuguese. However, in Mannar, for Catholics, Changillian was a villain because he executed 600 Catholic converts. His son, who converted to the Catholic faith was a hero to Mannar Catholics. I am saying this to show that Tamil nationalist ideology portrays Tamilness in a particular way by concealing all the caste, class, religious and regional differences. It is applicable to Sinhala nationalism as well.

AK: Can we talk about the shift to certain forms of violence. You mentioned violence in the community, or violence in the family, or violence of caste oppression or the violence of the Chandiyan. But when did violence become explicitly political in the mainstream. Of course as you mentioned there was the construction of the traitor and the rhetoric that traitors should not die a natural death. However, there seems to be a major shift in the seventies. Even though there was the violence of the caste struggles in the sixties which were also political, but that was of a different scale. How were the acts of violence received? Indeed, in the South, there was already a major insurrection by then.

R: I think that the Jaffna Tamil society is structurally violent because of the caste system. When an upper caste man’s honour is questioned he uses violence to assert his authority. If you look at it from the point of view of the ‘honour’ of Jaffna Tamil middle class upper caste students, the government’s introduction of standardisation was to humiliate them. Humiliation is not tolerated by an upper caste male dominated society. Therefore violence against Dalits was now shifted to the Tamil political field where you take revenge for the humiliation. In the early seventies, this became the attempted murders, followed by the arrest of the Maanavar Peravai members in the 1972, and the crack down by the State.

The other important event was the Tamil Literary Conference in1974, which was planned to take place in Jaffna, but the State attempted to block the conference and hold it in Colombo. But finally the conference was held in Jaffna, with the TULF mobilizing in a major way. On the last day of the conference, when the police blocked a protest, an electric cable fell, and nine people died of electrocution. I myself attended the conference the previous day, but I was not there on that last day. The conference could have happened without much mobilization if the State did not try to block it, but because of the State’s short sightedness, even in my village, I started organizing events celebrating the conference. We decorated the road and had booths to provide water and drinks, like in temple festivals.

During that time Sivakumar, a young Tamil nationalist, tried to assassinate one of the police officers and failed. And then he became a “wanted person” and during an encounter he took poison and died in the hospital. That was a major incident, with a mass funeral. A lot of students including myself attended the funeral. And I remember even girls attended the funeral, even though girls don’t normally attend funerals. There was always some kind of link between the TULF and these kinds of events. And the TULF called him a hero, and they compared him to Subash Candra Bose and said that although they followed Gandhian principles to achieve their goal, they respected Sivakumaran as he had the same vision.

AK: When did you become an active member of the LTTE?

R: During those days, there were two other people in my village who were older than me, and quite active. They wanted to do something as well. At that time, even I thought it was good to eliminate traitors!

There was a jail break and four people involved with the Maanavar Peravai escaped from Anuradhapura prison and there was some connection with my village. One person from my village who was involved with the Maanavar Peravai had hid one of these people in our village. That was in 1974. They knew we wanted to become active so they started to talk to us. At that time, I also bought a pistol from a local thug. I of course hid the pistol, the police was not the big problem for me, it was my father! (Laughter…) During that time I also started writing slogans on the wall, and one day a local person saw me writing on the wall, and I ran away and stayed with my aunt for a couple of days, because I was afraid of my father, that he would beat me up. Then I returned after my family was looking for me. My father was a local school headmaster, so during that time, Minister of Education Baddiuddin Mohammed was visiting and all the schools were expected to welcome him. So the previous night, I went with a friend and wrote slogans like “Baddiuddin Mohammed Get Out!” We were engaged in such activities, which were inspired by the TULF’s idea of protest. At that time, even more than opposing the State, we thought the “traitors” should be eliminated first.

So that was my first connection with the militants, when this person, Chetti, came and hid in our village, and I started helping them and then they did a Cooperative Store robbery. My role then was to take them to safe houses; I would take them on my bicycle and provide them with food and so on. And through such connections I met Prabhakaran. And Prabhakaran had also belonged to the Maanavar Peravai and it is through that connection that I met him in 1974 as well. Prabhakaran was talking about a separate state and I thought I will support him and that is how it all started.

The first organization Prabhakaran started was the Tamil New Tigers (TNT), the name was coined by Rasaratnam, who had been with the TULF and was a strong Tamil nationalist. Rasaratnam fled to India after Maanavar Peravai members were arrested and lived there until his death. Although the TULF was talking about federalism, I must say that the Suyaatchi Kazhaagam (V. Navaratnam’s organization) always compared the Tamils with the Jews. So, the ‘Exodus’ was translated into Tamil. And if you read ‘Viduthalai’ papers at that time, they always related the Tamil people to the Jewish people. We are intelligent and they are intelligent. We are a small minority and they are a small minority. They do fasts and do not eat meat during fasting and we do the same. They were able to form a country of their own and we should do that. Therefore Tamil identity is also mixed with Hindu Identity or Saiva identity. So Prabhakaran, Kuttimani and Thangathurai all took up this idea. Prabhakaran and Thangathurai were from the same village. But Thangathurai was not part of the TNT, because he thought Chetti who was in our group was sent to a rehabilitation school for young people and was a thief.

So there were so many factors and relationships. For example Valvettithurai was important, it was a smuggling village, and an army presence was always there. So, there was some tension. Whereas in my village, I would hardly ever see the army. At that time, the army was a symbolic force not a fighting army. And there were only a few thousand soldiers in the entire country, and to my recollection there were only 6000 armed forces personnel; including the army, navy and air force. But in Valvettithurai, there was always tension between the army and the people, and that is one reason why the young people from Valvettithurai became active. Thangathurai was pro-US and pro-Israel. Prabhakaran also had that idea, but strangely, he was also inspired by Hitler, so he had a copy of Mein Kampf. He also was inspired by Bhagat Singh and Subhas Chandra Bose. It was a strange combination at one level. I think his idea was about Jewishness and the State and the formation of Israel on the one hand, and then the idea of eliminating the “other” came from Hitler. So, there was a connection in his mind. Anyhow, I was an early member of the TNT, as it had been formed in 1974, and I joined them soon after. However I was not a full time member until 1976. None of us were mature enough to understand what we were doing. Part of the problem was the TULF, in that it did not have any concrete plans either to fight for federalism or a separate nation. The TULF just used all this rhetoric to gain parliamentary seats, but as a result these young people inspired by the TULF ideology wanted to fill the gap and this became a very dangerous problem.

AK: The iconic figures that you mention like Bhagat Singh or Hitler etc, were outside figures, were there any figures from the Tamil community that inspired the TNT?

R: No, even the Tiger, the flag comes from the Chola kingdom, so it was always inspired by actors outside. All this is part of the mythology, particularly when we claim, that we were two nations before the British came. We were unable to even identify with someone like a king from that nation.

AK: When did the interaction with India and Tamil Nadu begin? When did you first go to Tamil Nadu?

R: There was no direct interaction with India and Tamil Nadu. But in the early seventies itself, they would run to India to find safe haven. It had nothing to do with the Indian state or politicians; it was mainly through the smuggling links. They would go and stay with the Indian smugglers. I became “wanted” in 1976 and I went to India for the first time in 1976 in a boat from Mannar, which was arranged by Thangathurai. At that time, there were only a couple of local politicians who were sympathetic towards us.

AK: How did you become “wanted”? How did the police get to know about you?

R: On 27 July 1975, Duraippa was killed. I was not aware that he was going to be killed, but after he was killed, Prabhakaran came and hid in my grandmother’s house. I used to stay with my grandmother and give students tuition and I used that cover to hide these people. Again, so I can tell my father that I was teaching them mathematics, when he asked me about them. All though the TULF would claim to support us, they did not give us even fifty rupees. Once I bicycled from my village (Punallaikatuvan) to Valvettithurai to get ten rupees from a man, because we did not have any money.

One thing I was quite amazed by Prabhakaran at that time. He would come and hide in my grandmother’s house. I would go to college and return, and he would not have moved, he would be sitting in the same place. He was disciplined and extremely careful about his own safety in that sense. We did not have any money to run the organisation as we needed weapons, and so we robbed banks. So, in 1976 the Puttur bank was robbed.

Prabhakaran liked English movies not Tamil movies. He liked these Western and war films. That is where he learned to plan the robberies and to kill traitors. And he had very good memory power. If he met someone once, he will never forget them. We were a small organization and he would give ten bullets to one person and twenty bullets to another person and then he will remember exactly how many bullets we have left. He was also very organized.

So, after the Puttur bank was robbed, we started small farms with the money, and we cultivated onions and chillies. So, that was the cover, and it was our training camp. At that time, the TNT had about eight members and five of them were in the central committee, which included Prabhakaran, Aiyar, Pattanna, Kumarachelvam and I cant remember the fifth person. I was the youngest and a couple others were also in the group, including Chellakili. Then one person who was part of the bank robbery was caught. And he had given my name and I became “wanted”.

LTTE/Tamil Tiger SEA PIRACY

Source: Anonymous Patriot on the net

• In October 1994 LTTE destroyed the MV Ocean Traderoff Vettilaikerni
• In June 1995 LTTE destroyed the MV Sea Dancer off Kankesanturai
• In August 1995 LTTE attacked the MV Lanka Muditha off Kankesanturai
• In August 1995, the LTTE hijacked and looted the MV Irish Mona off Mulaithivu.
• In April 1996, the LTTE staged an abortive attack on the port of Colombo and damaged three foreign owned vessels.
• In August 1996, the LTTE blasted the Philippine registered MV Princess Wavewith underwater explosives while it was loading mineral sands at Pulmoddai. The cargo was for a Japanese consignee. 15 soldiers were killed.
• In May 1997, the LTTE blasted MV Athena, a Greek registered bulk carrier while in anchor in Trincomalee.
• In July 1997, the LTTE set fire to a 500 seat passenger ferry MV Mission, an Indonesian flagged vessel, transporting Tamil civilians from Mannar to Jaffna.
• In July 1997, the LTTE captured the North Korean registered, flagged, and crewed MV MorangBong, a 3000 ton general cargo vessel, which was anchored off Point Pedro. It had delivered a consignment of food to the Jaffna peninsula.
• In September 1997, the LTTE captured a Panama-registered, Chinese owned MV Cordiality, a bulk carrier, which was transporting essential food cargo. 5 Chinese crew members were killed.
• In August 1998, the LTTE hijacked the Indian owned MV Princess Kashoff Mullaittivu. The 6000 ton ship, chartered from Dubai based Goodwill company was transporting cement, dry food rations and vehicles for civilian use in Jaffna.
• In July 1999, LTTE destroyed the MV NewcoEnduranceat Trincomalee Harbour
• In September 1999, LTTE attacked the MV Juliaoff North of Mullativu
• In June 2000, LTTE destroyed the MV MercsUhanaoff Point Pedro
• In September 2001, LTTE attacked the MV Prideoff Point Pedro
• In October 2001, LTTE attacked the MT Dunhindaoff Point Pedro
• In March 2003, a Chinese fishing trawler namedFu-Yuan was captured and was exploded by the LTTE, killing 20 of its crew members.
• In December 2006, the LTTE attacked the Jordanian vessel MV Farah IIIand looted the ship.
• In January 2007, MV Liverpooldelivering relief supplies to Jaffna was attacked off Point Pedro.