Tuesday, February 24, 2009
Trying to solve ethnic conflict through federalism will lead to bigger ethnic trap
By Thomas Johnpulle
Supporters of federalism have spun up ahead of the ‘final’ battle in the North. Most of them fear that if the armed forces defeat the LTTE militarily, along with it the devolution endeavour will die. There are both supporting and opposing arguments; however, the real issue is the desirability and sustainability of a federal set-up.
Federalism cannot bring peace
A simple question posed by many opposed to federalism is ‘can it bring peace’. The answer is no. Many proponents of federalism argue that a utopian devolution mechanism to which everyone would eventually subscribe will cause things to happen in favour of bringing about peace. But the causal connection is too remote to rely on. Our bitter experience is that there can never be any practical devolution unit/mechanism/degree that all stakeholders can agree upon. Also the few available devolution mechanisms failed miserably to achieve any hint of peace. On the contrary; it was the 13th amendment and the resultant PCs that dragged the LTTE back to war (with the IPKF); it was CBK’s ‘package’ that caused so much pandemonium within and outside the parliament and eventually led to the untimely demise of her 2000-elect administration; devolution and its extent (ISGA verses nothing from the government) was the cause for the breakdown of peace talks in 2002. This is why successive governments call it a two-pronged strategy, a military strategy on one hand and a devolution attempt on the other. What this means is that Fed. or no Fed. war will continue until the annihilation of one fighting party.
Suppose a federal structure was put in place; then what? If the armed forces continue to remain in the N-E thereafter and even after the LTTE is ‘militarily weakened’, what are the chances of peace in the N-E? Many fear a jobless army is more dangerous as the US army in Japan, the IPKF in Jaffna after they ‘liberated’ it and the Russians in East Germany! On the other hand, if the armed forces leave the N-E, the ‘weakened LTTE’ will bounce back.
More complex issues exist about the police force.
Therefore, federalism cannot bring peace and only law and order can. For peace to hold, unlawful armed groups should be disarmed and lawful armed groups should uphold the law!
What does federalism has for the majority Sinhalese?
If nothing or nothing significant, call them whatever you will, they won’t support it; it is as simple as that. When a new election system was proposed recently, the SLMC declared that it will reduce the number of Muslim representatives in parliament and therefore they oppose it. Same fate will befall the federalism endeavour if the majority are not awarded substantial or at least significant benefits. In this context, it is important to consider the plight of minority Sinhala settlements in Trinco, Batti, Ampara, Vavuniya, Nuwara-Eliya, etc. under a federal set-up. They should be convinced that they will be better-off than they are under the central government. This is a very difficult thing to achieve given the complete lack of Sinhala representation among the political parties that are in strength in the N-E including TNA, SLMC, EPDP, PLOTE, TMVP, etc. The bottom line is they don’t trust these race-based political parties however much they try to contradict the ground realities - they are unable to command any trust from the Sinhala voters.
I have not seen anywhere how federalism can (as opposed to any other set-up) give the Sinhalese anything ‘extra’. Hence, most of them will not support a federal system. Their desire for a peaceful settlement of the ‘conflict’ should not be mistaken for a ‘federal system’ that places them under Tamil and Muslim political parties in whom they have zero trust and will add another overhead burden on the country just as the PCs.
A sustainable solution as opposed to one adopted under duress
If the international community pressurise the voters, parties and the government to agree to a federal set-up, the question arrises how sustainable it is?
Suppose, a federal solution is put in place after a lot of haggling, pressurising, etc. If it cannot bring about economic and political betterment in tangible proportions, the opposing forces will amass votes to bust it and that’s exactly what they will do when elected. Therefore, federal systems will not be able to be sustained unless they can add sizable amount of value to the aspirations of the majority. There is no point calling them names in order to avoid such an eventuality as it will surely happen. Can the international community suppress the opposing forces forever and can they continue to sustain the fragile ‘yes’ vote in favour of it? Very unlikely.
On the other hand, if a resolution can be reached that gratifies the popular vote base; such a system will be protected and promoted by the masses.
It is regrettable that most ‘political solutions’ disregard the aspirations of the majority and I do not think they will keep silent once the federalism matter hots up. Some of their (popular) leaders should be blamed for their part for not actively engaged in the process apart from opposing it outright.
Economics of federalism and the economic resources of regions
Who should benefit from the economic benefits of the Trincomalee harbour; the so-called ‘oil reserves’ off Manar; the remnants of the Mahaweli project in the N-E; huge mineral deposits especially along the N-E coastline?
Should it be the residents in these regions or the nation as a whole? Should these be sold outright, processed and then sold or left untouched?
These are the questions that can cripple any federal set-up. Regional leaders and national leaders will have widely opposing views. It is easy to say the whole country will eventually benefit, but practically it is very difficult as evidenced from around the world. Matters will get even worse if foreign parties enter the fray which is very likely to happen. Should we end up as East Timor where its oil resources are used by Australian companies with no benefits to East Timor and Indonesia?
On another count, should the Centre manage foreign investment inflows based on national criteria or should the regions manage it. The USD 300 million annually collected from the Tamil Diaspora will play a major role (it is approximately 1.3% of the GDP and without an obligation to repay) if utilised to achieve sectarian ends.
Already many concerned individuals have pointed out this matter and there will surely be more forthcoming.
Diplomacy
Should the regions be allowed to formulate their diplomatic priorities or should they follow the central government? If they do not have such powers, the regions will surely demand it. It is no secret that Tamils want much closer ties with Canada, UK, Switzerland and Tamil Nadu than now and similarly Muslims would want closer link-ups with the Islamic World. Tamil Nadu, Canada, Saudi Arabia and Iran are likely to have heightened diplomatic importance to the various regions. Apart from obvious conflicting interests among Saudi and Iranian interests (there were a few disturbing developments in the East last year), how can Tamil Nadu and Indian interest be managed by the Lankan central government and the regions? These conflicting interests will surely interplay with other matters like the Chinese developments in H’tota that includes a navel base.
Simply we are heading into diplomatic anarchy under federalism. On the other hand, if the regions’ rights to diplomatic interests are curtailed, would federalism achieve its desired targets?
National elections
Federalism can bring about more or less self-governing authorities in the regions. As a result, people’s interest in national elections may reduce. It should be noted that the voters’ turnout at the last presidential elections from 1988 to 2005 has been below 40% for the N-E as a whole. In the 1994 general election only 8 (eight) votes were cast from Jaffna district. If this happens, the significance and influence of national elections will reduce and as a result, the rights of individuals of certain communities will reduce. This is a very dangerous situation especially for the minorities living outside the N-E.
It is impossible to sustain a similar level of interest for regional elections and national elections at the same time when the regions enjoy substantial autonomy. Making it compulsory to vote as in some other countries would achieve little in this country.
Conflicts over water resources
A classic example is the Murrey Darling Basin development program of the Australian federal government. This is not supported by states amidst a severe drought that has hit Australia. Victoria has repeatedly and decisively declined to cooperate as it has enough water resources. Sri Lanka is not too far away; it should be recalled that this concern was embedded into the ISGA-2003 proposals by the LTTE which stated (the reality) that most waterways flow from outside their territory and hence water users in upper areas should use it carefully. The severity of this is so enormous that the government restarted the war in 2006 following the Mavilaru incident.
It will be unimaginably chaotic in a federal set-up and the army will have to be called-in to settle the matter given the fact that water is as important as gold in the dry zone. Prolonged and persistent conflicts can take a heavy toll and things will surely escalate when political forces interplay with them.
It is foolhardy to expect that our politicians would have national interests in mind than their Australian counterparts!
The risk of outside interferers
Another big risk for the country and the regions is the risk of heightened outside interference. NGOs and even the UN may run their own zones within some regions. In the absence of an acceptable regulator to both the regional and the central governments, these issues are likely to take the centre stage in any federal setting in Lanka.
There are a few defence pacts the country has already signed and there will be conflicts if the regions refuse to honour them. For an example consider the ’super secret’ defence pact with the US. Can US ships (en route to an attack in the Middle East) call at the Trinco navel base when it comes under a predominately Muslim council?
Should the state be selective in its arms purchase that Israeli weapons will not be deployed in certain areas?
If the World Tamil Congregation (banned in India recently) tries to hold their rally in the N-E with the approval of the regional council, can the Sri Lankan government ban it likewise? I doubt it as the government couldn’t ban such events as the ‘Pongu Thamil’ that was nothing but separatist propaganda.
Can India allow federalism to take root in Sri Lanka?
May be yes in 1987 but not now. In 1992 India banned the LTTE not because of Rajeev Ghandi or Sri Lanka, but rather because its influence on India’s own territorial integrity. This was evident in the report that called for a continued ban on the LTTE that was presented to the Indian parliament in 2007. Citing this, prominent constitutional lawyer HL de Silva stated that division of Lanka would be the epitaph of India.
Provided that a federal set-up will result in a more disintegrated Lanka, it is unlikely that India would support it wholeheartedly. It is also concerned about possible Western/Islamic influence in its backyard. This may in part explain why India has played a dormant role as regards federalism in Lanka; even the 13th amendment 20 years ago had little Indian input.
However, what is considered in Sri Lanka is much more dangerous than federalism itself; it is a strange variant that can be described as ‘racial-federalism’. This doesn’t sound well but that’s exactly what most politicians in favour of federalism demand. A separate Muslim Unit within the Tamil Homeland? Separate Sinhala units within each of them? How ridiculously racial? We are likely to fall into a bigger ‘ethnic’ trap if we try to solve the ‘ethnic’ conflict by federalism. My personal view is that we should be moving in a different direction that can integrate the ethnic groups. We don’t differentiate ethnic celebrations, ethnic foodstuff and ethnic attire. We need more than Dosai Villas, Buhari Cafes and Bath Kades; we need our fellow citizens who run them to live and thrive in our nation among us.
Federalism, however, goes against this Lankan spirit to start with! No wonder the forefathers of Lankan federalism were not from Sri Lanka
Entry Filed under: Federalidea
A Federal System Means a Tamil Nadu in Sri Lanka
The naked reality of Indian federalism can be seen from Tamil Nadu. It is terrifying on one hand and kind of outlandish on the other. India has been a federal country. But unlike many other federal countries in the world, its federal boundaries run along racial lines. Nothing much has happened over the years in terms of colonisation of Tamil Nadu by non-Tamils. Over 95% of India’s Tamils still live in Tamil Nadu and over 95% of those who are living in Tamil Nadu are Tamils! There are many freedom struggles across India based on race. Development has done little or nothing to take away separatism.
However, India with its third largest army and the largest paramilitary force in the world has managed to keep separatists under check. When compared to the wealth of the LTTE, India’s separatist fighters are penniless. Tamil Nadu had its own separatist struggle before 1962. It failed owing to many reasons, most importantly thanks to anti-separatism legislation. But the flame of separation has not died. Their desire to be a separate nation is channelled to sympathy for the Tamil Elam struggle across the Palk Strait. At least two Tamils have committed suicide showing support to the ‘liberation struggle’ in Sri Lanka and at least two more have attempted it within the space of a few days.
Open Support for Tamil Elam and LTTE
Most Tamil Nadu political parties support Tamil Elam and the LTTE to various degrees. They have done their share to please the LTTE. This is exactly what will happen in Northern and Eastern parts of Sri Lanka if anything similar to Tamil Nadu is created without proper ethnic integration.
Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Muthuwel Karunanidhi played a number of antics until the Sri Lankan Army Commander’s comments brought him to his senses. Thirumavalavan also showed what he can do with a four day fast unto death! Vaiko used his eloquent nonsense to make his presence felt. These are the type of politicians Sri Lanka will have if a Tamil Nadu is created here.
Given the massive support for the Tamil Elam struggle from Tamil Nadu, one can only imagine the support a local Tamil Nadu will have for it. Therefore when a federal structure creates a Tamil Nadu equivalent in Sri Lanka, federations on both sides of the Palk Strait will be on fire demanding Tamil Elam in one voice.
Rulers of Sri Lanka should not be carried away by petty assurances given by their close associates who are either running regional administrations in the north-east at the moment or tipped to become administrators in the near future. The period of honeymoon won’t last long. Their camaraderie is only with the incumbent President and no sooner he leaves office, hell will break out.
The outcome of regional elections immediately following military victories cannot be considered representative of ground realities. But as time passes by, seeds of separatism will again germinate as before. They have almost a century-old divisive/racial political infrastructure to build on.
LTTE – a political affair
Nothing about the LTTE is a political affair in Central India. LTTE ban that was imposed in 1992 continued regardless of who was in power. However, in Sri Lanka the LTTE ban has been a political affair. It was imposed in 1998 by the PA government and within just months after UNP assumed office the ban was lifted in 2002 only to be reimposed by the UPFA government. Political parties made agreements with the LTTE in the lead up to crucial elections in 1989, 1994, 2001 and possibly 2004 and 2005. In simple words main political parties made alliances with the LTTE in all national elections after 1983. If this is the plight of the national political parties, the plight of regional political parties in the north-east will be much worse. They will have to please the remains of the LTTE, its still functioning overseas branches, its ancillary organisations in Canada, UK, Singapore, etc.
Eventually regional administrations in the north-east will become puppets of overseas LTTE branches.
It was reported that the Tamil Nadu police was after troublemakers who caused havoc in the name of supporting Tamil Elam. Police did a good job in quelling trouble. However, in Sri Lanka this will not happen. The police will be either under the regional administration or the central administration. Or it may be torn between the two! In any case the police will be serving its political masters. As a result if a Tamil Nadu equivalent is created in Sri Lanka, its police will be no more than legitimised rebels.
Racial politics
Race-based political parties only care about the people of its race; they don’t pay any attention to others. If a representative from another community is included in their party, he would be just a yesman. Examples are All Ceylon Tamil Congress, Singhala Maka Sabhai, Ilankai Thamil Arasu Katchi, Tamil United Liberation Front, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (registered in 1989), Tamil National Alliance, Muslim Congress, Sihala Urumaya, Hela Urumaya and Sinhalaye Maha Sammatha Boomiputhraya Party. In wide contrast national political parties are concerned about a wide section of the population irrespective of race.
When two race-based political parties compete with each other, the party that is seen as most racist wins because race is the main criteria and the reason for the parties’ existence. Unfortunately this is what happened in north-east politics ever since 1931. A gradual descend is seen from the ACTC to TNA. ACTC was with the 1947 elect government in most part of its existence. Its successor, ITAK, joined with the governing coalition for a shorter span of its existence. TULF and TNA were worse and showed no co-operation whatsoever and the latter being the worse of the two. As explained above this gradual descend into total tribalism is the outcome of competition between two or more race-based parties.
Without a doubt the northern region and the eastern region will be dominated by race-based parties in time to come when the heat of the military victory dies down. That was how these regions have always been! Then it will be much worse than all the above mentioned parties combined. Please note that none of the above mentioned parties had any instrument or establishment to govern at will. In a federal structure or reasonably autonomous structure, these parties will have a large territory and sufficient powers to play with. The outcome will be calamitous.
To make things worse they will influence the central government as well. Their support in forming a ruling coalition in parliament would be crucial and their co-operation would be on condition of support to their agendas. At Presidential elections, they can shut out the voters if they so desire altering the outcome. Like in Tamil Nadu they will flex the muscle to get what they want from the central government. Although the Indian central government, especially the Indian Prime Minister stood firm, Sri Lanka will never have politicians of that calibre!
Racial Federalism
The Northern Province is a Tamil only region after the LTTE succeeded in a double genocide by 1990. If a federal structure is created either along provincial boundaries or racial boundaries, it is ‘racial federalism’ we are talking about. This is not going to solve the ethnic problem. In fact it will only aggravate it by further isolating communities.
Culturally the Northern region will be with Tamil Nadu, not Sri Lanka; spiritually it will be with Tamil Nadu, not Sri Lanka; politically it will be with Tamil Nadu, not Sri Lanka (the sheer number of visits our northern politicians made to Tamil Nadu explains this); economically it will be torn between Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka (especially when thriving trade between the two ‘states’ recommences after the war). Clearly the Northern region will be in most part aligned with Tamil Nadu, India than Sri Lanka!
Is this what the people of Sri Lanka (irrespective of race) want? They have shown otherwise by vehemently rejecting federalism; even toned down versions. Governments had to risk their very existence trying to push these ‘solutions’. As the (political not racial) majority do not support them, they will never succeed on the ground. Forcing federalism (or toned downed versions) on the people under curfew, under siege from a foreign army, under threat of sanctions or any other compulsion will only make it worse.
Another big confusion is about ‘who needs a solution’; should it be Sri Lankans or Tamils? If it is Tamils, and not all Sri Lankans, then there is little justification for non-Tamils to agree on such a solution. It is as simple as that. When 20 million people are craving for solutions to their problems, only solving the problems of Tamils while the others are still hungry and craving, will lead to commotions, if not war.
As long as some proponents of ‘political’ solutions fail to grasp this reality, there cannot be a political solution which means either the parties must battle it out or live with it.
The Right Solution
The right solution should defeat racism, separatism and block the avenues of another potential uprising. As long as the North remains mono-ethnic, race-based politics will rule it as it did from 1931 to this date. This is the ideal breeding ground of racism, separatism and terrorism. In fact the north was the only place race-based politics thrived most. Most separatist leaders emerged from the North and without a doubt according to the Mahaveer listing of the LTTE, most fighters also came from the mono-ethnic North! This is no coincident.
The only way is to ethnically integrate the North as any other province. There is a huge added economic advantage too. There are hundreds of thousands of hectares of arable land and hundreds of kilometres of coastline that offers gainful employment to the farming and fishing communities that are crammed into an unsustainably small area at the moment. Once a thriving economy shared by Sinhalas, Tamils and Muslims is created in the north which in turn benefits the country, the country will be inseparably bound to the north and vice versa. It will also change the mono-ethnic North into a bubbling multiethnic community where race is no longer a political tool.
The North will be as diverse, colourful and beautiful as the National Flag leaving no room for separatism. How can separatists claim it as Tamil homeland (or part of it), if Tamils are only one part of its community?
As a by-product, it will also rubbish the Tamil homelands concept which stood in the way of ethnic integration for over 80 years.
However, the separate Tamil cultural and religious identities must be kept as they are. There is no justification for a dilution of the unique Tamil culture in the name of integration. Separate Tamil political aspirations would disappear in favour of national aspirations.
http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2009/02/federal-system-means-tamil-nadu-in-sri.html
People have found a solution to Sri Lanka’s problem: Adopt it!
It is important to define the problem before attempting a solution. Few facts need to be addressed at the outset.
Is there an ethnic problem in Sri Lanka? Yes and reasons are given below.
Will a political solution end LTTE’s violence campaign? No, because LTTE is not driven by the people and violence is a way of life for senior LTTE leaders who can run their project regardless of the thinking of the Tamil people. A classic example is the plight of about 250,000 Tamils civilians trapped in the Vanni. They know that more than 2,000,000 Tamils are living outside the LTTE controlled areas. The few that are trapped very much want to escape the LTTE but have no say and no way. LTTE tells them what is good for them!
Will there be a permanent peace if both the ethnic problem and the LTTE problem are resolved? No, Sri Lanka, as any other developing country will continue to experience violence. Wide spread discontent in the society irrespective of ethnicity, the high crime rate, high suicide rate, the likelihood of a third JVP-style insurgency, violent trade union action and counter-action, ill effects of globalisation and political violence are possibilities. Tackling them takes a long time and until such time the country will have to live with them. It may be recalled that within 12 years of gaining Independence, a Prime Minister was gunned down in this country. Worse, the culprits were not punished! It bears testimony to the fact that there was ample violence in the society even before the eruption of war. Expecting a utopian peace in the short term is only foolhardy.
Is there an ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka? No, although there is an ethnic problem and a conflict there is not ethnic. In the contemporary Sri Lankan society in government controlled areas there is ethnic unity in spite of war in some parts of the country. If the conflict were an ethnic conflict, Colombo would be the battlefield, not the Vanni!
Unfortunately, these four trivial and straightforward issues dominate the discussion about political solutions and as a result, real issues have gone unaddressed.
The biggest hindrance to solving the ethnic problem is that it has at least two contradictory definitions. There is no possibility that these contradictory definitions reconciled.
Definition Number One (as the majority Sinhalese see it)
Ethnic Problem is the lack of unity among people of various ethnicities and the lack of ethnic diversity in some parts of the country.
This is the popular view. Unity – coexistence, interdependence and harmony among people of various ethnicities in Sri Lanka – is an untold success story. There is no ethnic disunity in any part of the government controlled area. Every district of Sri Lanka is home to thousands of Tamils. However, divisive forces are still at play. They play the race-card for their survival. A good example is race-based political parties. Although a large number of Tamils and most Muslims have embraced the two national political parties, race-based political parties still exist. Their very survival depends on ethnic division.
Also there are at least three districts in the north where Sinhala and Muslim civilians were completely ethnically cleansed by the LTTE. Today Sinhalas and Muslims cannot live in these districts because of their ethnicity. Stemming from this is the other aspect of the problem: lack of ethnic diversity in the north. Vast resources including the expanses of land in the north must be available to people of all ethnicities.
A political solution should strengthen unity among ethnicities and do away with demarcations and divisions and enhance ethnic diversity in the north. For such a solution, there is no need to create regions vested with power, no need for devolution, no need to have racial bargaining and absolutely no necessity to entertain racial aspirations.
The argument that devolution should be based on development doesn’t hold water. Undeveloped areas could be developed through a national development plan, rather than through a regional development plan. The tragic failure of the Provincial Councils in carrying out development work is only too well known. This has happened despite the fact that all those councils have at their helm the same ruling party as the centre. But, at the same time, it is not difficult to imagine what would happen if two different parties came to power at the centre and in the PCs. There are enough and more local government bodies like municipal councils, urban councils and Pradeshiya Sabhas and they can handle all regional issues effectively.
The concept of ethnic homelands is totally rubbished by this view that only recognises one undivided nation for all the people to live everywhere. Race has no place in this definition. Grievance handling is done without regard to ethnicity. The overriding notion is that "Sri Lanka should be for all Sri Lankans".
The implementation of this solution depends on military operations and according to this school of thought the deployment of the military in any trouble spot is in order and democracy should be the basis of decision making.
Definition Number Two (as the Tamils see it)
The ‘Ethnic Problem’ is about not fulfilling Tamil aspirations. Tamil aspirations include the acceptance of the Tamil homeland, Tamil right of self-determination and Tamil nationality. Ethnicity matters most. If these demands cannot be granted outright, they must be granted in part. But in the short run something should be granted so it will help achieve the aforesaid aspirations in the long run.
The political solution would actually create disunity in the country to the extent that space is created for meeting Tamil aspirations. If the country remains unitary (the highest form of unity), there would be no space for Tamil aspirations. Too much unity means Tamils will have to conform to the general Sri Lankan values and lose their aspirations.
Tamil aspirations are that North and the East must be unified so that a large part of their "traditional Tamil homeland" will remain together. Colonisation schemes that cause demographic distortions of the north-east should stop. Regions should be vested with power, including legislative power and power over land. Power should be devolved to the largest possible unit created in the north-east. Development is a secondary objective as development without Tamil aspirations means nothing!
Race-based political parties are the key to governance and they must be promoted. The overriding concept is Tamil aspirations and Tamils, especially Eelam Tamils have a say in governance of the north-east whether they live in Sri Lanka or not. Tamil Diaspora’s role is critical.
Military operations stand in the way to peace according to this view. Essential military activities may be carried out, but they too should cease at the earliest. Certainly no large "occupying army" should be stationed in the Tamil majority areas. Democracy alone cannot guarantee this type of a resolution. Therefore, a certain amount of imposition is needed as a counter to the majoritarian rule. Help and pressure of international actors are essential for finding a solution.
Contradictory
These definitions (the first definition and the second definition) contradict each other. What’s more interesting is that a solution found according to one view becomes a problem according to the other.
Suppose a solution was introduced that further strengthens the unitary status of Sri Lanka, allows "colonisation" of the north, helps national political parties to gradually replace race-based political parties or establishes a grievance handling procedure without regard to race, that "solution" will be seen as the intensification of the ethnic problem by those who hold the opposing view.
Similarly, if a solution introduces a federal structure in place of the present unitary structure, starts addressing race-based grievances and addressing problems from a racial perspective or further strengthens race-based political parties, according to the definition number one, this "solution" would amount to the worsening of the ethnic problem.
One man’s solution is another’s problem!
All the pundits who advocate an unspecified political solution carefully avoid this reality. Those who suggest specific solutions, try to impose themselves on others. No attempt has been made to understand and appreciate these differences. It must be noted that no lasting solution can be evolved at the expense of the interests of either of these two groups. These two views cannot coexist as they contradict each other. Superficial attempts to reconcile the two fail to bridge differences that arise outside the drawing board.
A Compromise
Theoretically, a compromise should be possible. However, given the completely opposing views, a compromised solution will not work at all. A compromise between the two would only disappoint both groups and aggravate the problem. This has happened too many times in the past. A worse situation can arise from a compromise. If only one party compromises, the other (the uncompromising party) can demand further compromises. This way the uncompromising party can gradually push the other party to an extreme. Unfortunately, this is what has happened with all political solutions Sri Lanka has experimented with. Tamil Elamists demanded compromise after compromise from the other side while not budging a bit themselves. Their greed knows no bounds that they ultimately led to the total breakdown of the political process. Certainly, a compromise is not going to work again; it will only disappoint both groups and drive them to extremism.
Ignoring the problem is another way to handle it, rather than complicate matters! Most Lankan politicians opted for that easy wayout.
However, the ethnic problem demands a solution.
What should the solution be?
The solution is out there
The ethnic problem coupled with the war, wreaked havoc throughout the country; mostly in the north-east. Commander after commander waged war in the north-east in search of peace. Tigers in turn bombed civilians in the south umpteen times. Amidst all these chaos, there are people who found solace, harmony and relative peace. They ran to these oases in hundreds of thousands from warzones.
There is a big difference between where they ran from and where they ran to. They essentially ran from mono-ethnic enclaves in the north to multiethnic communities in the south. Race mattered most in the mono ethnic enclave but it mattered less in multi ethnic communities. Belonging to the "right" race was a prerequisite to live in the mono ethnic north but was not so important in the multiethnic community in the south.
Had they waited till politicians found a solution to their problems, they would have died by now! Not only did they run to the solution, they became an integral part of the solution! Unfortunate events of 1983 didn’t repeat thereafter thanks to the multiethnic community that flourished in the South. Few unfortunate matters that affected only a fraction of the Tamil community in the South have happened but they left hundreds of thousands of Tamils without a scratch. Unfortunately, the North was cursed with tribalism and ethnic isolation which further bred intolerance.
If the Southern model is introduced to the North, it will be as peaceful as the South. Of course it will not solve the terrorist element which has to be addressed militarily.
This solution, although it looks like a combination of the above discussed solutions, is actually divorced from both views. It is not based on any theory to begin with. It all started when people themselves found a solution out of the mess that existed around them.
Politicians, academics, professionals, diplomats, priests and even Maharishis can split hairs and argue for importing alien solutions, but none will work so well as the people’s solution has worked.
Also it is a fact of life that some problems do not have solutions. For instance there is no room for a separate Tamil (or Sinhala or Muslim) nation in the island of Sri Lanka. This fact must be formally established. That will not give any solace to those who want it, but it will help them recover from the misery of not having a solution to their problem. No solution can equally satisfy all.
By Thomas Johnpulle
The Sri Lanka Guardian
Sunday, February 22, 2009
Tamil and Sinhala Identities- Their Plausible Origins and Consequences
This is a work in progress in which I have developed preliminary ideas about the evolution of identities which set the background for the racist-ideology of the LTTE. It is however more than that and attempts to understand the evolution of the current identities of the Sinhalas and the Tamils. The references associated with these assertions will be added in time.Names of Empires of South India are not identified with the language Tamil:
Pandya, Chola, Chera (Chera later developed their own language Malayali, Pandyas controlled South India and Sri Lanka in early times- Sinhala is probably derived from them. Modern Tamil can best be attributed to the Cholas)
Sangam Literature mentions Tamil as a language:
Tolk ã ppiyam (derived from combination of two words- Tonmai meaning ancient and Kappiam meaning literature) is work on grammar. The exact date is not known (poor archaeological evidence) but based on “linguistic evidence” is dated around 1st century BCE. It is said to have been based on Sanskrit grammar.
A “scientific breakthrough” was achieved in analysing the syllables and classifying the alphabet into vowels and consonants.
The term Sangam derives from the Buddhist Sangha (South India was under the control of Buddhist Kings the Kalabras (not Tamil). Dravida Sangha was established by a Jain named Vajranandi. This influenced interest in the Tamil language and literature.
The prePallava literature does not mention Sangam academies. Thus it is likely that these academies occurred much later than the time attributed to them (in BCE).
This is not to say that the the literature associated with Sangam were not present in the period 200BCE to 300 CE, but it is likely to have been orally transmitted and probably could not have been identified as “Tamil” as such.
It should be kept in mind that South India was largely megalithic until well into the first Millenium. Anuradhapura was the largest city in the south comparable to two northern Indian cities. Thus it is more likely that Prakrit evolved more in northern Sri Lanka than in Southern India.
Tamilakam
Some authors are of the opinion that Tamilakam (Tamil country) did not exist archaeologically. The people of South India appear to have been loosely associated and linked by the similarity of the proto-tamil language that they used. The Sangam literature classifies clans of people based on the type of occupation and where they live.
On the other hand two Chinese monks in the early centuries of the Common Era (CE) have mentioned the island of the lion people (Sinhale).
The earliest archaeological evidence connecting sangams with the city of Madurai is the Cinnamanur inscription of the Pandyas (10 th century).
The word Tamil
Tolk ã ppiyam while being dated to the 1st century BC may have been a generic grammar for a number of southern languages and not necessarily for Tamil.
The word for Tamil occurs in Tolk ã ppiyam in the form of senthamil (classical) and kotunthamil (colloquial). Sinhala grammar for example follows similar principles and unlike Tamil had acquired Sanskrit forms in its alphabet as well (same as Malayalam).
The etymological roots of “tamila” or “Tamiza” could be traced to give similar meanings (one’s own tongue) similar to Siyabasa of the sinhalas.
Dravida vs. Damila
It is likely that the words used in Mahavamsa (Sinhala cronicles) for Tamil, Damida and Damila were pointing to the sinhalese identifying an ethnic subgroup in ancient Sri Lanka. These words probably equate to Dravida Sangha as created by the Buddhist Jains and possibly the Tamil language perhaps generated with the Tolk ã ppiyam. I would suggest that the Cholas who build a magnificent empire were responsible for the development of Tolk ã ppiyam and identification of the language Tamil. It is interesting that neither the Cholas nor the Cheras called their language after their identity. The Pandyan language is extinct except perhaps for the Sinhala, which is identified with the identity of the island and people of Sinhale.
The Tamil Country and identity was never a united concept until the advent of the Chola empire (Chalukya Chola). This only lasted for a brief period but spread to most of Sri Lanka and to most of South east Asia. It is likely that the Chola suppression of Buddhism (even though at one point they protected it) in favour of Saivism for the hundred or so years of their rule over much of Lanka l(9-10 century CE) left an indelible imprint in the consciousness of the Singhalese that Tamil speakers could do it again.
Sinhala
There are claims that the Sinhala was not a language until the 12th century and that there was no sinhala identity until then. However, there are others who refute this based on the vast historical evidence (both linguistic and archaeological) of such an identity. One such argument is the inscription left by the Chinese invaders of about this period which included Chinese, Pali (Chinese were Buddhists) and Tamil (Tamil was by this time the maritime language of the region thanks to the Chola empire) but not Sinhala.
The evolution of South Asian and South east Asian language scripts from Brahmi demonstrates that Sinhala and Tamil script evolved in parallel (although sinhala-prakrit was probably commenced its evolution at an earlier stage) and had reached a mature stage by the time of the Chola empire.
Sinhala folk oral tradition of the Middle Ages which has been committed to writing demonstrates a very strong identity at least in this period (to the exclusion of other identities). It could be extrapolated based on Mahavamsa which was written in pali by Mahanama Thera in the 6th century CE (based again on much older oral tradition) that such an identity (Sinhala) existed for much longer. There is no indication of significant identification of Tamil as a major enemy in the Mahvamsa period. The hostility of Sinhalas towards foreigners (including Europeans and Chola Tamils) may have emerged in the context of almost continuous attempts at suppression of Buddhism by invaders since the Cholas. The Sinhala mind set which appears to have developed a character of being under siege, in the 19th and 20th century may have one explanation in this historical feature.
Sinhala identity was certainly well formed by the time of the English occupation. Some of the proponents of Tamil homeland concept point out that the Kandyan treaty was signed in tamil and malayali as well as sinhala as evidence of a divided nation (in fact there is speculation to suggest that Mahanilame, Ehalepola signed in Tamil to indicate that it was signed under duress ; to abrogate later; when making a more emotionally significant plead on behalf of family he signed in sinhala). However, the much more likely explanation is that despite language differences people were united under the sinhala flag and nation.
The Origin of Tamil as a nationalistic identity
So far in this exploration I have found no evidence of a unique and continuous “Tamil” identity, which incorporated a language, a country and a people. Language as distinct and written does not appear until the Chola empire and the Demeda and Damila identity as an ethnic grouping has only been recognised in Sri Lankan rock edicts earlier.
The earliest development of Thamilakam (Tamil Country) as a concept incorporating a people, a territory and language which I can find is in the 19th century when some Sri Lankan (Jaffna) elite collaborated with Indians in the Madras Presidency to evolve the idea of a Dravidastan.
Arumuga Navalar (1822-1879) a high caste Jaffna Tamil appear to have made the first attempts at spreading tamil consciousness in Jaffna and South India. He was a crucial player in re-establishing the Shiva agamic faith and Tamil literacy in South India and Jaffna. He and his followers established the society for preservation of Shaivism and the Jaffna Hindu college by the end of the 19th century. It was he who influenced the Governor of Ceylon to appoint Ponnambalam Ramanathan to the legislature.
Another important figure was Thamothran Pillai, the first Jaffna Tamil to graduate from Madras University in 1858. He was greatly influenced by Bishop Robert Caldwell’s (1856)division of languages in India into Indo-Aryan and Dravidian. This appears to have been seminal in the commencement of Dravidian and Tamil consciousness in India and Sri Lanka.
Subsequently Pillai, Virasoiyam and Kalitokai brought out publications on Tamil Classics. It is said that the modern linguistic consciousness of Tamils people can be traced to this period. One Tamil scholar even considered Tamil (language) as Goddess.
Subsequent movements for an independent Dravidastan from these beginnings is not clear but I would postulate that the Jaffna Tamil elites mainly identifying themselves with the Chola Ksyatriya invaders were conscious of their “elite status” and expected to be political leaders of at least Lanka if not the subcontinent. The attempts at secession may have been in recognition that they could not hold such leading positions without complete hegemony over a territory.
The idea of Dravidastan was finally laid to rest with the India-China war (1962) and legislation banning secession. In 1969 Madras State was reconstituted and the Tamilnadu state was born, completing the Tamil Identity.
Thus Tamil identity with a territory and a people and a language appears to be a relatively modern concept in comparison to Sinhala identity. The divisions such Caldwell’s led to dividing the people of India and Sri Lanka along the Aryan-Dravidian divide, whereas modern genetics demonstrate that people of the subcontinent are essentially genetically indigenous and mixed (thus the race theory is artificial). Thus the Sinhale which was the name for the people of the island became an ethnic entity for the first time.
While the Tamils of India had an identity, this left the elite Tamils of Sri Lanka without the political benefits of this. The communication ascribed to the Ponnambalam brothers (elites who appear to have thought they were the heirs to Sri Lankan rule), Chelvanayagam (a Tamil brought up in Malaysia with no loyalty to Sri Lanka) and Amithralingam (the only ordinary son of the soil ) indicate that they wanted the Tamils of Sri lanka to remain an elite section of society.



Tamil Racism is the Kami-kaze of Tamil Federalist Politics
February 22, Toronto, Sri Lanka Guardian
When the first tiger plane appeared in the Sri Lankan skies two weeks after the Ides of March, 2007, client intellectuals of the LTTE cooed glowingly and applauded the "innovative engineering skills" of the emerging Eelam. Kumar David, an engineering professor whose vain effort has been to engineer the "permanent revolution", wrote in the Tamilnet extolling the innovative engineering that had gone into it.
When I, a non-technical old fogie inquired from my more tech-savvy grand children, the facts seems to be quite the opposite. Apparently, one can buy kits for less than the cost of a motor bicycle, together with instructions on how to fit them together. Dime a dozen magazines like "Popular science", "Popular mechanics" etc. discuss these hobby kits all the time It seems that undergraduate students have small hobby clubs where they assemble such planes for fun, during the Canadian summer holidays. So then, why did this Professor Kumar David rush to extol the adaptation of these hobby planes into weapons of terror and suicide?
Kumar David is arch-typical of the lost intellectuals of the Colombo set. They read and write for the benefit of self-anointed "cosmopolitan people" of Sri Lankan extraction who are actually "Scotch" by absorption. Their biggest horror is being bed fellows of the "Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinists" (SBCs). These SBCs were the people who took control of government in 1956, and whose regime was threatened from three sides. First of all there was the Sydney Soyza-Jungle Dissnayake-Anghie types, representing the right-wing Christian groups who felt that the country had "gone to the dogs". Then there were the Marxist elders of the Kumar David types, thinking that the SBCs are like the Menshevik government that proceeded the "Great October Revolution" of Lenin. The great dialectical sages argued that "according to Historical materialism", it is the turn of the "true revolutionary left" to come to power next, displacing the SBCs. The third force was the Tamil Sovereignty lobby, led by Samuel J.V. Chelvanayagam, E.M.V. Naganathan and others who had belonged to the Christianized governing classes of the Tamils.
Today we see Kumar David, Wickramabahu Karunaratna, Vasudeva Nanayakkara and other left-over stumps of the old left become clients and fellow travelers of the LTTE. How did this happen? How can so called "word revolutionaries" who do not even recognize national boundaries gradually come to support a racist, fascist outfit and even accept the territorial claims of the Eelamists? Why does Wickramabahu K go to Kundasle with Ranil Wickremasinghe to say that Sinhala youth are dying in a "land which is not theirs". These Marxists differ from the "Sinhala" Marxists of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) because they do not have any links with the majority, but are themselves a minority, largely coming from the English educated scotch loving community. Many journalists like Tissaranee Gunasekera, "Shanie" etc., belong to this culture. They are still fighting the battle they began in 1956 against the "Sinhala Buddhists". Hence they see the LTTE as natural allies .
It should be emphasized that a good section of the English educated Tamils were NOT racists, but cosmopolitan individuals who had middle-of-the-road liberal views. There were also many English educated Sinhalese who held similar liberal views. Politicians like the Senanayakes, Arunachalam Mahadevas, civil servants like the Kanagasundarams, and their immediate kith and kin were probably in that class. Also, one can say that the middle and lower classes among the Sinhalese, as well as among the Tamils, were people who were tolerant individuals, NOT bitten by the scourge of racism which was at the root of the "Arasu katchchi" campaign of Chelvanayagam et al.
The racist program of the Arasu Kadchi had, already in 1949, stated an exclusive claim to the North and East of Sri Lanka as "traditional homelands" of the Tamils. Even though the name "Tamil", "Dameda", or "Dravida", had not even been used until about the "cankam period", circa 1st century CE,, the Arasu Kadchi writers claimed that the "original inhabitants" of Sri Lanka prior to the arrival of Vijaya were Tamils. Thus Ravana was claimed to be a Tamil king, and Kuveni was conscripted as a Tamil princes deceived and discriminated by Vijaya, the first Sinhala. The stage was set for the "struggle" to drive out the Sinhalese, the Muslims and other "invaders" from "The Tamil homeland".
The British historian Jane Russell states that "Ceylon Tamils had no written document on the lines of the Mahawamsa to authenticate their singular and separate historical authority,... a fact which (they) found very irksome". The many stone inscriptions and Buddhist ruins attesting to this irksome history were also very inconvenient. Thus arose the early campaigns of G. G. Ponnambalam against the "mahavamsa mindset", which later developed into the extensive
territorial claims regarding which K.M. de Silva says "in less than a decade of its enunciation in 1949, [this] theory became an indispensable and integral part of the political ideology of the Tamil advocates of regional autonomy and separatism".
Victor Karunairajan, certainly a cultured Tamil who is clearly no supporter of violence, writing in the Sri Lanka Guardian (Link ) on the 3rd of February 2009, discusses the French-English problems of Canada as a prelude to discussing the ethnic problems of Sri lanka. Karunairajan wants to "recognize three primary stratifications in the ancient order of the Kotte, Kandy and Jaffna kingdoms in a political structure with considerable powers vested in the central government to ensure this evolves progressively into a proper federal state over a period of time". Other writers often quote the discredited "Cleghorn minute" of the 18th century to justify and validate the idea of a Tamil nation. Should we then, at the same time attempt to rectify the deep malaise of the Quebec separatists who have even refused a re-enactment of the battle of the Plains of Abraham? Should we revert to the French, English, Spanish possessions of the Americas that prevailed in 1759 CE? In the same vein, should we return to the political boundaries that prevailed in Europe within the old order of Metternich, to appease the Austrian nationalists and the Hapsburg loyalists?
Political solutions have to be built on existing realities and NOT on what existed at the time of the arrival of Chandrabhanu, Chankilli, Cleghorn or even Brownrig.
Just as there were Kingdoms of Kotte, Kandy and Jaffna in the 15th century, there were also even more important divisions into caste enclaves at that time. Are we to recognize those hierarchical structures as well? Where do we draw the line? The need to legislate the caste system into the constitution was held to be paramount by a number of prominent Tamil leaders including Ponnambalam Ramanathan who led delegations to London on that very issue. Did not this question come up even in front of Soulbury who found the very idea repugnant? If Tamil leaders could, as recently as Vadukkoddei-1976 embrace the concept of a mono-ethnic, racially exclusive Tamil Eelam whose logic is exactly the same as the Afrikaanar-Apartheid idea of separation of races, anything can happen. In fact, a recent e-mail letter circulated under the hand of "son of Eros" argued for an Eelam where the traditional concepts derived from the Law of Manu should be imposed! However, I believe that just as the issue of enshrining caste in the constitution has more or less disappeared today, the need to institutionalize the ethnic divide (and there by buttress the divide) would also disappear within one generation. Here we should note that the division between the Kandyan Sinhalese and the low-country Sinhalese has virtually healed, although this too was thought to need a "federal solution".
Victor K, as well as Ms Sharma, a "student" of Satchi Sithananthan have also taken up a defense of Federalism and argued that federalism is in no way a racist option. Indeed, this is entirely correct if taken "tabla rasa", i.e., free of context. But unfortunately, this is NOT the case in Sri Lanka where federalism was merely the English language masquerade of the Eelam objective of the Arasu lobby. This objective of the Arasu Kadchchi, and the roots of the "Tamil-nation mindset" had been identified by historians like K. M. de Silva and political scientists like A. J. Wilson (see the discussion by Michael Roberts, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol.XXVII, no.1, April 2004).
Initially, this "Tamil-Nation mindset" had no fuel to fire upon. The moderate Tamils did not take the Arasu Kadchchi seriously, while the Singhalese thought of them as a "fringe group". In 1956 the "Sinhala-Buddhist" ground-swell came up with the Sinhala-only cry and provided Chelvanayagam with the fire that he had been waiting for. The "sathyagarahas", "civil disobedience movements", tar-brushing of Sinhala street names etc., taunted the Sinhala majority and produced the violence and "state terror" that the separatists actually called for. The Chelva-Banda pacts were NOT trusted by both sides of the ethnic divide, while they were hailed as the right thing by the English educated urban set who could not read Tamil and had no knowledge of the clearly Eelamist program of the Arasu Kadchchi. Thus the polarization of the nation into two warring factions, gored into increasing frenzy at each race riot, was well on its way. Even the 1983 Black July riots were provoked by the Tamils AND certain sections of the Jayawardene government who probably thought that the Tamils can be "cowed down by suitable intimidation".
It is in this context that the word "federalism", as applied to Sri Lankan politics, has become a corrupt cover for Eelam. In fact it is even worse. One has to only read S. Makenthiran, (I believe an accountant turned political commentator) who writes in the 19th February issue of the Sri Lanka Guardian (Link) to see that Tamil chauvinism is inexhaustible. Just as Chelvanayagam labeled Ponnambalam a "traitor", Makenthiran labels Ananadasangaree a "traitor". If Chelva and Ponna had lived a few more years, they too would have been labeled traitors by the LTTE. While the Sri Lankan government issues stamps commemorating these individuals, the LTTE stamps them out! The racist, fascist nature of Makenthiran's writing is evident. Sentences like "Tamil Nadu Tamils have come out in full support of their Eelam Tamil brethren. Blood is thicker than water" etc., show the level of jingoism, self-deception and deviation from reality that is possible. The Eelam supporters are now hoping for a "federal solution" with India as the central government. That is, they envisage separation from Sri Lanka and annexation to India. I think neither Victor K, nor Renuka Sharma thought of "Tamil federalism" as a process leading to joining up with India because "blood is thicker than water". But that is the Sri Lankan reality of "federalism".
The argument that "blood is thicker than water" is just a racist idiom. In Sri Lanka's context, it is not even biologically true. Most of the Tamils in the Vanni who are considered to be Tamils today were the sinhalese who were thrown out of the Jaffna peninsula by Chankili. Names like Balasingham with the "sinha" ending, do not occur in Tamil Nadu. Such matters have been discussed by Modern sociologists as well as Swami Rasanayagam (Ancient Jaffna), and also K. Vellupillai (Yalpana Vaibhava Kaumudi). Many low-country sinhalese are descendants of the Kauvravas and other Dravidian groups. However, today they may be fiercely sinhala chauvinist, just as Makenthiran is fiercely Tamil chauvinist. So the nearest kin of the Tamils are actually the Sinhalese. Here Vicotr K has correctly pointed out that right through the ages, the Indians have used the Tamils of Lanka as pawns of their political objectives.
Today we have the chance of entirely getting rid of an armed fascist war lord who has traumatized Tamil society. Being a Tamil is a cultural thing and NOT an issue of genes or blood. We value our language, literature and our way of life. I have lived in Jaffna, Mannar, Hatton and Colombo. I found the enriching experience of multi-cultural life in Hatton and Colombo, and found that for the first time, caste and other prejudices did not really matter, unlike in our Tamil society "Race" is nothing but a bigger label similar to the caste labels of earlier times. Federalism based on racial criteria will fail in Sri Lanka.
Tuesday, February 17, 2009
ETHNIC INTEGRATION as a Permanent Aid to Communal Harmony & National Security
Integration of the different ethnic communities of Sri Lanka into a single people with a single Sri Lankan identity is the only permanent solution to that can bring communal harmony and national security to Sri Lanka. ETHNIC INTEGRATION, as defined here, does not refer to mixing of people on a genetic basis. For example, it does not imply intermarriage between Sinhala and Tamil people, although when men and women are neighbors and work together, they do fall in love, marry and produce children of mixed ethnic heritage. Although that is perfectly normal, that is not what I mean here by ethnic integration.By Ethnic Integration, I mean is that policies are implemented to homogenize the distribution of all ethnic communities throughout the land, as far as possible, towards the average ethnic distribution in the country as whole. Thus, ideally, we would have the same percentage of Sinhala, Tamil, Moslem and Burgher people in every province, district, city, town, village, school, in work places, public institutions, defense forces, and so on. Ethnic diversity and cultural richness in people as individuals would still find expression in the proper sphere: in their homes, at their places of worship, in community centers, in ethnic restaurants, etc.
The benefit is that no region of the country would be dominantly mono-ethnic, and no one community would be able to claim any region as a separate mono-ethnic state. Every community is, and all communities are, would be present at each and every location. This also means, that children of all communities would learn together, eat together, play together, and grow up together during their formative years. Adults of all communities would work together, grieve together, eat together, and help each other through their lives. In this way, people of all communities would get to see and appreciate our common humanity, rather than the abstract differences defined sharply by separate existences out of contact with each other.
In the United States, Anglo-Saxon, Chinese, Indian, Hispanic and African American families live amicably together in the same neighborhood. They often meet at neighborhood parties, at work in their gardens and garages, and strike up personal friendships. This was largely how it was when I was growing up as a child in Sri Lanka in a suburb of Colombo. Through such contacts one begins to empathize with people of different ethnic backgrounds, and to instinctively recognize that our differences are only superficial.
If ethnic integration, as I advocate here, is implemented in Sri Lanka, then the Sinhalese will be the ethnicity of the majority community everywhere in the land, but the society as a whole will not be MONO-ETHNIC, but MULTI-ETHNIC, with the minority communities present everywhere. The attainment of that goal will completely eliminate any basis for future separatism based on communal differences in Lanka.
The remedy we propose here is no different from that in evidence in the United States, for example, where the majority of the people everywhere are of non-Hispanic European extraction, yet everywhere there are ethnic minorities, to varying degrees. Due to different birth and immigration rates, this may change in the future from a non-Hispanic to a Hispanic majority. The movement of American people between states in search of jobs, and less expensive retirement friendly locations, seem to be the primary drivers for homogenization of ethnicities previously set by historical immigration and settling patterns. Hopefully, US demographic and income patterns will not become severely biased regionally in the future to set the stage for communal separatist movements, as overpopulation, environmental and economic pressures increase, and rabble-rousing politicians move to exploit the situation to propel themselves into power.
Unfortunately, in Sri Lanka's past, this kind of intimate contact between communities was attained only in the major cities, making it easy for isolated communities to demonize each other: unseen, unheard, unfelt, untouched. Through a policy of ethnic integration, we are proposing to make intimate contact between different communities an ubiquitous feature in every part of Sri Lanka, and to build a single Sri Lankan identity as one people who have transcended their superficial differences to join hands in celebration of their common humanity.