Senators were mainly curious to know what the Sri Lankan issue is all about.
Former Ambassador’s View (the person with most credible views in the eyes of the senators)
1. Had a positive view about Sri Lanka and seeing the end of the conflict.
2. Stated that US has no strategic interest in Sri Lanka (good news for Sri Lankans and bad news for Ranil Wickramasinghe who wanted to create an international safety net against LTTE).
3. Stated that LTTE has no interest in peace, withdrew from peace efforts, killed moderate Tamils, killed Tamils who wanted peace.
4. Stated that US has no leverage in Sri Lanka because there is no military aid or economic aid given to SL from US.
5. Stated that it is just a help we can lend to make SL peaceful and prosperous, nothing else.
HRW as expected talked very negatively about Sri Lanka. At the same time they stated that LTTE was shooting and killing civilians trying to leave the conflict zone. Anna Neistat said that LTTE was committing war crimes. Her other focus was the resettlement of civilians. She wanted to take the issues to UN. She also said that China and Russia are likely veto such moves. Also she said that China and Russia cannot block what UNHCR will be talking about and they have to get it going soon.
CPJ as expected talked lots about journalist and how scared they are in Sri Lanka. Bob Dietz talked a lot about Lasantha Wickramathunge’s demise. Bob Dietz suggested granting them refugee status in the west. The journalists who spoke to Bob were pessimistic about seeing an end to the conflict soon.
Dick Lugar was the only senator who had some idea and had a favorable view of Sri Lanka.
End of the day, if anything, LTTE yielded no positive image from the hearings. It only reinforced the negative side of LTTE. At minimum, all the writing we did may have nullified what the terrorist supporters wrote. The other important thing the committee heard was that President Rajapakse and his military campaign against LTTE is enormously popular among Sri Lankans. The committee heard it loud and clear that President Rajapakse is executing the peoples will of defeating terrorism in Sri Lanka. The committee also learned that the only leverage they have is in future money they are going to "lend" for rehabilitation of the conflict zone through World Bank and ADB. The also learned that they may have some leverage through Japan.
Perhaps, we should get somebody like Palitha Kohana to talk to HRW and CPJ next time. Furthermore, their activists should be highly scrutinized for any connections with LTTE. Most importantly we should find our friends who do not try to impose their will on us (this is something we should really work on). It was such a great feeling to learn through HRW and CPJ that the west has not got lot of leverage in Sri Lanka. My guess is that US senate will not do a thing since they have many other strategically important issues in hands to solve these days.
Tuesday, February 24, 2009
A Large Fleet of Low-Cost Propeller Driven WW-II Fighter Planes for Coastal Defence
The purpose of these P51 Mustang fighter planes would be for low-tech warfare; not for opposing the state-of-the-art airforces of other countries. They are perfect for shooting down Zlins, patrolling the sea coast, taking out gun/ammunition smuggling vessels, and for close air support against troops, trucks and guns, and destroying earthbund fortifications. They served these same purposes during WW-II in addition to protecting bomber formations against German fighters during bombing runs over Nazi Germany.
Pilots were trained in as few as 4-months for flying P51 single-engined fighter planes during WW-II. These planes were superb highly maneuverable long-range planes that were used to escort bombers over Germany and shoot down attacking Me109 and FW-190 German fighters. Training a pilot to fly a P51 at slow speeds is not as difficult as training a jet fighter pilot...reaction time limits are much longer. Training pilots would not be a big problem.
The most serious new type of threat they would face would be from shoulder fired rocket-propelled SAMs (e.g., Russian Sagger-type, and US Stinger-type) travelling at high speed, that are available even to the LTTE only in very limited numbers. The SAMs can be confused by a variety of counter measures that can be deployed from P51s also. The tight turning radius of a P51 can be used to avoid SAMs which cannot turn as fast at their high speeds; this is not possible with jet fighters which largely depend on high-speed to outrun the SAMs, and on countermeasures to divert the SAM homing sensors.
Obviously, it is not the best, safest, state of the art solution. An advanced VTOL aircraft, such as a British/US Harrier, that can fly at both high and low speeds, can hover in one place, can liftoff and land vertically on small field, and has state-of-the-art countermeasures would be the way to go, if we had the funds. My idea is only an affordable solution for a poor country; a solution that would allow us to deploy the hundreds of aircraft needed to maintain a intensive detect-and-destroy coverage everywhere.
The low cost of these planes is a great advantage. Just imagine, 150 planes can be bought for, say $2,000,000, which is much less than the price of one Harrier. We can use 50 of those planes for spare parts, and fly the remaining 100 forever, until Sri Lanka becomes rich enough to afford better weapons. In the post war period, this solution will allow us to tightly protect our coast and territorial waters. We can refurbish and use LTTE's airstrips for this purpose as regional airfields close to the field of action.
Another idea would be to develop a similar low cost fleet of sea-planes with either a boat-like fuselage, or two independent floats in addition to wheels, for landing on water surfaces. These planes can land in the ocean near ports when the sea is calm, or land in lagoons or in our inland tanks/ reservoirs. The sea-planes with floats can be P51 mustangs, with the undercarriage permanently extended and wheels and floats incorporated as a single unit to allow landing on either land or water. Such a modified P51, of course, would not be able to fly at the high speed of one without modification, because of the extra drag of the extended undercarriage. That is the trade off.
These ideas can be combined to provide a low cost mix of planes to meet our security needs, and would complement the more advanced jet fighter force of the SLAF.
December 31, 2008 8:40
Pilots were trained in as few as 4-months for flying P51 single-engined fighter planes during WW-II. These planes were superb highly maneuverable long-range planes that were used to escort bombers over Germany and shoot down attacking Me109 and FW-190 German fighters. Training a pilot to fly a P51 at slow speeds is not as difficult as training a jet fighter pilot...reaction time limits are much longer. Training pilots would not be a big problem.
The most serious new type of threat they would face would be from shoulder fired rocket-propelled SAMs (e.g., Russian Sagger-type, and US Stinger-type) travelling at high speed, that are available even to the LTTE only in very limited numbers. The SAMs can be confused by a variety of counter measures that can be deployed from P51s also. The tight turning radius of a P51 can be used to avoid SAMs which cannot turn as fast at their high speeds; this is not possible with jet fighters which largely depend on high-speed to outrun the SAMs, and on countermeasures to divert the SAM homing sensors.
Obviously, it is not the best, safest, state of the art solution. An advanced VTOL aircraft, such as a British/US Harrier, that can fly at both high and low speeds, can hover in one place, can liftoff and land vertically on small field, and has state-of-the-art countermeasures would be the way to go, if we had the funds. My idea is only an affordable solution for a poor country; a solution that would allow us to deploy the hundreds of aircraft needed to maintain a intensive detect-and-destroy coverage everywhere.
The low cost of these planes is a great advantage. Just imagine, 150 planes can be bought for, say $2,000,000, which is much less than the price of one Harrier. We can use 50 of those planes for spare parts, and fly the remaining 100 forever, until Sri Lanka becomes rich enough to afford better weapons. In the post war period, this solution will allow us to tightly protect our coast and territorial waters. We can refurbish and use LTTE's airstrips for this purpose as regional airfields close to the field of action.
Another idea would be to develop a similar low cost fleet of sea-planes with either a boat-like fuselage, or two independent floats in addition to wheels, for landing on water surfaces. These planes can land in the ocean near ports when the sea is calm, or land in lagoons or in our inland tanks/ reservoirs. The sea-planes with floats can be P51 mustangs, with the undercarriage permanently extended and wheels and floats incorporated as a single unit to allow landing on either land or water. Such a modified P51, of course, would not be able to fly at the high speed of one without modification, because of the extra drag of the extended undercarriage. That is the trade off.
These ideas can be combined to provide a low cost mix of planes to meet our security needs, and would complement the more advanced jet fighter force of the SLAF.
December 31, 2008 8:40
Unitary & Federal State Forms of Government
The terms unitary state and a federal state have different, highly significant, legal implications with respect to their constitutions and the power of the central government.Most important are: a unitary state may abolish a constituent sub-state entity, and upgrade or degrade its powers without agreement of the sub-state entity. In a federal state, the central government is not empowered to do so.
That is why, that Sri Lanka insists on being a unitary state as opposed to a federal state.
On the other hand, a united state, has no such specific connotation, and may refer either to a unitary state, or to a federal state. In that case, you have to look at the country's constitution to determine whether it is in fact a unitary or federal state.
It is interesting to note here, that the US Civil war was waged to prevent the Confederate states from seceding in what was a federal union of states! So, ultimately might prevails over constitutional law.
From: Wikipedia.org
A UNITARY STATE:
A unitary state is a state whose three organs of state are governed constitutionally as one single unit, with one constitutionally created legislature.
The political power of government in such states may well be transferred to lower levels, to national, regional or local elected assemblies, governors and mayors (devolved government), but the central government retains the principal right to recall such delegated power (e.g. the period when Farum Municipality was ruled by the Danish Government for a time, or the era of direct rule in Northern Ireland by the United Kingdom's central government in London from 1973 to 2007).
The designation unitary state contrasts with federal state. In a unitary state, any sub-governmental units can be created or abolished, and have their powers varied, by the central government. The process in which sub-government units and/or national or regional parliaments are created by a central government is known as devolution. A unitary state can broaden and narrow the functions of such devolved governments without formal agreement from the affected bodies.
A FEDERAL STATE:
In federal systems, by contrast, assemblies in those states composing the federation have a constitutional existence and a set of constitutional functions which cannot be unilaterally changed by the central government. In some such cases, such as in the United States, it is the federal government that has only those powers expressly delegated to it.
Most states in the world have a unitary system of government. Many federal states also have unitary lower levels of government. Thus while the United States itself is federal, the U.S. states are themselves unitary, with counties and other municipalities having only the authority given (devolved) to them by the state constitution or legislature.
The devolved powers and laws of the subnational entity may be overridden, or the entity's law-making power curtailed, by an ordinary law of the national government, or by a simple decision of the head of government. The United Kingdom is a good example of this: Scotland has a wide degree of autonomous law-making power, but there is no right for Scotland to challenge the constitutionality of UK national legislation, and laws of Scotland can be overridden, and the powers of the Scottish parliament revoked or reduced, by an act of the national parliament or a decision of the Prime Minister. In the case of Northern Ireland, the devolved powers of the region have been suspended by a simple government decision on several occasions. Thus, the UK is still a unitary state, despite superficially appearing somewhat like a federal state in practice.
Devolution (like federation) may be symmetrical (all regions having the same powers and status) or asymmetric (regions varying in their powers and status). UK devolution is asymmetric.
A UNITED STATE:
United is used in a countries name, when any number of states or regions are combines to make a united Country. Countries with united in their name include:
Examples:
1. United States of America (USA/ U.S./ United States) - A federal state
2. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK/ United Kingdom) - A unitary state
January 24, 2009 1:32 PM
Tamils must ask for what is reasonable and accept their role in the conflict
by S. Rasalingam
One of the important, and valid messages contained in Satheesan Kumaran's message, published in the Midweek review if The Island of 20th February is that we need bridge-building among the different communities. But he observes it in the breach.
Hurling accusations does not help. He claims, "The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka between the Sinhalese and Tamil-speaking has been a creation by the Sinhala leaders". Then Kumaran proceeds to attack Theravada Buddhism, and gives advice to Buddhist monks. He says "Irresponsible words of politicians in Colombo will only add fuel to the flames of destruction engulfing Sri Lanka politically, economically, militarily, culturally and socially, rather than educate communities on the importance of co-existence." He goes onto claim "what Sri Lankan politicians really want is to create a society of voiceless citizens remote-controlled by a bunch of politicians."
Surely, such voiceless citizens already live in the Vanni and how did that come about? We Tamils have not understood how we dug our own graves.
Kumaran says, "A national consensus can only be achieved when the Sinhalese embrace the minorities and win their hearts and minds". Here again it seems that only the Sinhalese have to act. Don't we Tamils have to also act to reassure the majority?
As an aging Tamil who has observed Tamil-Sinhala politics since the 1940s, I cringe to see the continued repetition of simplified and historically incorrect hurling of accusation, even by a man who recognizes the need for building bridges between communities. People of Kumaran's generation do not know that politicians like D. S. Senanayake (DS) tried to create a "Ceylonese" nation.
Much false propaganda has been generated and good men like DS have been besmirched. People like Ponnambalam Ramanathan, in collusion with Governor Maitland introduced the principle of "communal representation" in the legislative process. Some Sinhala leaders rejected this ("Ramanathan's deception"), and then came the Donoughmore commission which proposed Universal Franchise.
Surely, it was a defining moment when the Colombo Tamil leaders decided that their dominant position would be threatened, unless they separated themselves from the Sinhalese, and call for a separate identity. G. G. Ponnambalam (GGP) in the State Council in 1934 declared that he was "a proud Dravidian" and rejected the "Ceylonese" concept of a polity of a single people. Natesan and others followed suit, as a reading of the political history of the times will reveal. Ponnambalam lent his voice to a movement which began to attack Sinhala Buddhists, and the Mahavamsa, their famed historical chronicle. Should I remind Mr. Kumaran that the first Sinhala-Tamil Riot occurred in 1939, in Navalapitiya, and spread to Passara, Maskeliya and to many other towns, when the Colonial government stepped in and stamped it out?
The riot was sparked by the inflammatory racist speech of GGP in Navalapitiya, attacking the Sinhala Buddhists and the Mahavamsa (see The Hindu Organ, June 1, 1939 and other newspapers of the time). It was then that S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike (SWRD) saw an opportunity, and went to every one of the cities touched by the riots, and established branches of the Sinhala Maha Sabha (see The Hindu Organ, June 19, 1939). It was in this extremely heated atmosphere that GGP developed his fifty-fifty solution as a means of safeguarding the dominant position of the Tamils. Far from bridging the gap between the communities, every action of GGP was designed to drive this "difference" between the Tamils - descendants of the Dravidians, and the Sinhalese, a "hybrid mongrel race split of from the aboriginal Tamils and mixed with Aryan invaders" (as stated by GGP in Navalapitiya in 1939).
The racism of the GGP et al was matched by the SWRD group. It would seem that SWRD the feudal aristocrat, and GGP the caste-conscious Catholic lawyer, were both power-hungry manipulators of the people for further their own interests. The elder statesmen of the times, i.e., Baron Jayatilleke, D. S. Senanayake (DS), Mahadeva etc. charted a reasonably non-communalist line.
DS in particular realized that public confrontations would be a grave obstacles to independence and bridge-building between the communities. When the Soulbury commission arrived, Senanayake managed to get the "Young Turks" like SWRD and others not to appear before Soulbury, and imposed a formal boycott while making room for informal contacts. GGP however appeared before the Soulbury commission and whenever possible for three months, claiming that the Tamils were being discriminated against in jobs, education, health, colonization settlements, etc. He even objected to the declaration of Anuradhapura as an archaeological conservation area as an act of discrimination. The Soulbury Commissioners rejected virtually all of GGP's claims as being without foundation. It rejected the 50-50 demand, i.e., equal number of seats to the 12% Tamils and 75% Sinhalese as an attempt to subvert democracy.
The Sinhala leaders refrained from public confrontation with GGP during the Soulbury period, and this led to a sense of healing between the communities. The state council approved the Soulbury proposals overwhelmingly. GGP leading the Tamil Congress(TC), as well as SWRD and other Sinhala nationalists joined the DS cabinet which believed in the "ceylonese" concept (see Senanayake's Acceptance Speech in the Hansard 1947).
Meanwhile, dark clouds were gathering. The ultra-nationalist Tamil wing led by S. J. V. Chelvanayakam (SJV) was not happy. They grumbled about GGP's approach, and proposed that instead of 50-50, the Tamils must pursue the "Two-Nation" concept, where the Tamils are equal to, and distinct from the Sinhalese. SJV said that Tamils should pursue their separate destiny. The opportunity to break from GGP arose with the Indian Citizenship Act. Most Ceylonese leaders and the Colonial government had become worried that the Indian Tamil workers and the Estate sector would fall into the hands of the Marxists who had began militant agitations. The new citizenship act required that only persons with seven years of residency could become citizens and vote in elections, thus eliminating transients. GGP and most other Tamils voted for it. But SJV declared that GGP was a "traitor" to the Tamil cause and used the moment to create the Tamil Arasu Kachchi. SJV contended that the Citizenship Act violated minority rights, and challenged it, and the government, in the courts, and in the Privy Council in London. The unequivocal judgments were that there has been no discrimination before or after the Act, and that the citizenship requirements were as reasonable as in the most liberal European states at the time.
Nevertheless, the Arasu Kachchi kept on agitating, determined to drive a wedge between the two communities, i.e., even among the anglicized Colombo citizens. I have attended meetings in Jaffna where the Arasu Kachchi talked of a separate Tamil nation, while in Colombo they sounded moderate and talked of federalism. A golden opportunity for the Arasu Kachchi arrived with the election of SWRD as PM. SWRD was a politician who recognized the rights of minorities, and an accommodation could have been easily reached with him. But the Arasu Kachchi's public position in Jaffna was well known to the Sinhala nationalists who had deep distrust of SJV, E.M.V. Naganathan and others. If there is no trust, there can be no political Pact.
It is easy to blame the "Buddhist monks" for the failure of the Banda- Chelva Pact. But what did this Banda-Chelva Pact ask for? It asked for Tamil administrative regions in the North and East. At that time, just as today, the East involved Muslims and Sinhalese and Tamils. The Muslims opposed the Banda-Chelva Pact. The Sinhalese in the East opposed the B-C pact. The Arasu Kachchi had done NOTHING to build bridges between the two communities and win their confidence. Instead, they used every opportunity to confront the Singhalese. Ponnambalam and the TC also opposed the B-C Pact.
The B-C pact was NOT based on discrimination. It was based on the "Homeland Concept". It asked for the same 2/3 coastal area and land area as a "homeland" for the Tamils (12% of the population) that the LTTE today is asking for. If the Arasu Kachchi had only asked for the Northern province and if its leaders had reassured the Sinhalese and Muslims, the B-C Pact would have had some chance of survival.
If the proposed B-C pact had actually got enacted, the Sinhala nationalists would have demanded the Tamils living in Weallawatai and Kottachenai to leave. The 1983 Black July would have happened decades earlier.
I have began from the Donoughmore Era and reviewed the history to indicate to young people like Satheesan Kumaran that the story is not black and white, with the Sinhalese doing all the bad things and "creating the ethnic divide", while the Tamils meekly performed "satyagraha" to win their rights both sides have been at fault.
The Tamils in the Vanni and other areas are not like their caste conscious counterparts in, whose only desire has been to retain their political power, and rule the North as absent landlords. The Vanni Tamils ("Malabars" in the language of the 1815 Kandyan Treaty, and also in Cleghorn's report to the Colonial office), like the Singhalese, have a lot in common as our religion, social organization and language are very similar to that of the Sinhalese people. Although GGP and SJV attempted to emphasize differences, these are the same stock of people with mere superficial differences.
The LTTE is a creation of the elitist Colombo Tamils who decided to use the lower caste "boys" in far-flung areas to promote their misguided political struggle making our children mere cannon fodder. Meanwhile, their children, kith and kin have gone abroad and continue to finance a psychopath who has eliminated out teachers, our kurukals, writers, journalists, political leaders and thinkers, so as to create a subservient society toeing his line with no questions asked, in the name of Eelam.
So, Kumaran what is there to be negotiated?
Kumaran is proposing conflict resolution via negotiations. As Anton Balasingham once stated, "Only the borders remain to be negotiated". It should not be forgotten that the Arasu Kachchi, while talking of Gandhian methods, secretly supported the creation of young militant groups. SJV personally met and worked with Sivakumaran, who was the first to commit suicide by swallowing cyanide.
I am sorry to say that the Tamil leaders of the 1930s, and then the ultra-nationalist activism of the SJV platform have been largely responsible for the plight of the Tamils today. Blaming the Sinhalese for all our ills won’t do. We need to soften our acrimonious uncompromising stand.
One of the important, and valid messages contained in Satheesan Kumaran's message, published in the Midweek review if The Island of 20th February is that we need bridge-building among the different communities. But he observes it in the breach.
Hurling accusations does not help. He claims, "The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka between the Sinhalese and Tamil-speaking has been a creation by the Sinhala leaders". Then Kumaran proceeds to attack Theravada Buddhism, and gives advice to Buddhist monks. He says "Irresponsible words of politicians in Colombo will only add fuel to the flames of destruction engulfing Sri Lanka politically, economically, militarily, culturally and socially, rather than educate communities on the importance of co-existence." He goes onto claim "what Sri Lankan politicians really want is to create a society of voiceless citizens remote-controlled by a bunch of politicians."
Surely, such voiceless citizens already live in the Vanni and how did that come about? We Tamils have not understood how we dug our own graves.
Kumaran says, "A national consensus can only be achieved when the Sinhalese embrace the minorities and win their hearts and minds". Here again it seems that only the Sinhalese have to act. Don't we Tamils have to also act to reassure the majority?
As an aging Tamil who has observed Tamil-Sinhala politics since the 1940s, I cringe to see the continued repetition of simplified and historically incorrect hurling of accusation, even by a man who recognizes the need for building bridges between communities. People of Kumaran's generation do not know that politicians like D. S. Senanayake (DS) tried to create a "Ceylonese" nation.
Much false propaganda has been generated and good men like DS have been besmirched. People like Ponnambalam Ramanathan, in collusion with Governor Maitland introduced the principle of "communal representation" in the legislative process. Some Sinhala leaders rejected this ("Ramanathan's deception"), and then came the Donoughmore commission which proposed Universal Franchise.
Surely, it was a defining moment when the Colombo Tamil leaders decided that their dominant position would be threatened, unless they separated themselves from the Sinhalese, and call for a separate identity. G. G. Ponnambalam (GGP) in the State Council in 1934 declared that he was "a proud Dravidian" and rejected the "Ceylonese" concept of a polity of a single people. Natesan and others followed suit, as a reading of the political history of the times will reveal. Ponnambalam lent his voice to a movement which began to attack Sinhala Buddhists, and the Mahavamsa, their famed historical chronicle. Should I remind Mr. Kumaran that the first Sinhala-Tamil Riot occurred in 1939, in Navalapitiya, and spread to Passara, Maskeliya and to many other towns, when the Colonial government stepped in and stamped it out?
The riot was sparked by the inflammatory racist speech of GGP in Navalapitiya, attacking the Sinhala Buddhists and the Mahavamsa (see The Hindu Organ, June 1, 1939 and other newspapers of the time). It was then that S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike (SWRD) saw an opportunity, and went to every one of the cities touched by the riots, and established branches of the Sinhala Maha Sabha (see The Hindu Organ, June 19, 1939). It was in this extremely heated atmosphere that GGP developed his fifty-fifty solution as a means of safeguarding the dominant position of the Tamils. Far from bridging the gap between the communities, every action of GGP was designed to drive this "difference" between the Tamils - descendants of the Dravidians, and the Sinhalese, a "hybrid mongrel race split of from the aboriginal Tamils and mixed with Aryan invaders" (as stated by GGP in Navalapitiya in 1939).
The racism of the GGP et al was matched by the SWRD group. It would seem that SWRD the feudal aristocrat, and GGP the caste-conscious Catholic lawyer, were both power-hungry manipulators of the people for further their own interests. The elder statesmen of the times, i.e., Baron Jayatilleke, D. S. Senanayake (DS), Mahadeva etc. charted a reasonably non-communalist line.
DS in particular realized that public confrontations would be a grave obstacles to independence and bridge-building between the communities. When the Soulbury commission arrived, Senanayake managed to get the "Young Turks" like SWRD and others not to appear before Soulbury, and imposed a formal boycott while making room for informal contacts. GGP however appeared before the Soulbury commission and whenever possible for three months, claiming that the Tamils were being discriminated against in jobs, education, health, colonization settlements, etc. He even objected to the declaration of Anuradhapura as an archaeological conservation area as an act of discrimination. The Soulbury Commissioners rejected virtually all of GGP's claims as being without foundation. It rejected the 50-50 demand, i.e., equal number of seats to the 12% Tamils and 75% Sinhalese as an attempt to subvert democracy.
The Sinhala leaders refrained from public confrontation with GGP during the Soulbury period, and this led to a sense of healing between the communities. The state council approved the Soulbury proposals overwhelmingly. GGP leading the Tamil Congress(TC), as well as SWRD and other Sinhala nationalists joined the DS cabinet which believed in the "ceylonese" concept (see Senanayake's Acceptance Speech in the Hansard 1947).
Meanwhile, dark clouds were gathering. The ultra-nationalist Tamil wing led by S. J. V. Chelvanayakam (SJV) was not happy. They grumbled about GGP's approach, and proposed that instead of 50-50, the Tamils must pursue the "Two-Nation" concept, where the Tamils are equal to, and distinct from the Sinhalese. SJV said that Tamils should pursue their separate destiny. The opportunity to break from GGP arose with the Indian Citizenship Act. Most Ceylonese leaders and the Colonial government had become worried that the Indian Tamil workers and the Estate sector would fall into the hands of the Marxists who had began militant agitations. The new citizenship act required that only persons with seven years of residency could become citizens and vote in elections, thus eliminating transients. GGP and most other Tamils voted for it. But SJV declared that GGP was a "traitor" to the Tamil cause and used the moment to create the Tamil Arasu Kachchi. SJV contended that the Citizenship Act violated minority rights, and challenged it, and the government, in the courts, and in the Privy Council in London. The unequivocal judgments were that there has been no discrimination before or after the Act, and that the citizenship requirements were as reasonable as in the most liberal European states at the time.
Nevertheless, the Arasu Kachchi kept on agitating, determined to drive a wedge between the two communities, i.e., even among the anglicized Colombo citizens. I have attended meetings in Jaffna where the Arasu Kachchi talked of a separate Tamil nation, while in Colombo they sounded moderate and talked of federalism. A golden opportunity for the Arasu Kachchi arrived with the election of SWRD as PM. SWRD was a politician who recognized the rights of minorities, and an accommodation could have been easily reached with him. But the Arasu Kachchi's public position in Jaffna was well known to the Sinhala nationalists who had deep distrust of SJV, E.M.V. Naganathan and others. If there is no trust, there can be no political Pact.
It is easy to blame the "Buddhist monks" for the failure of the Banda- Chelva Pact. But what did this Banda-Chelva Pact ask for? It asked for Tamil administrative regions in the North and East. At that time, just as today, the East involved Muslims and Sinhalese and Tamils. The Muslims opposed the Banda-Chelva Pact. The Sinhalese in the East opposed the B-C pact. The Arasu Kachchi had done NOTHING to build bridges between the two communities and win their confidence. Instead, they used every opportunity to confront the Singhalese. Ponnambalam and the TC also opposed the B-C Pact.
The B-C pact was NOT based on discrimination. It was based on the "Homeland Concept". It asked for the same 2/3 coastal area and land area as a "homeland" for the Tamils (12% of the population) that the LTTE today is asking for. If the Arasu Kachchi had only asked for the Northern province and if its leaders had reassured the Sinhalese and Muslims, the B-C Pact would have had some chance of survival.
If the proposed B-C pact had actually got enacted, the Sinhala nationalists would have demanded the Tamils living in Weallawatai and Kottachenai to leave. The 1983 Black July would have happened decades earlier.
I have began from the Donoughmore Era and reviewed the history to indicate to young people like Satheesan Kumaran that the story is not black and white, with the Sinhalese doing all the bad things and "creating the ethnic divide", while the Tamils meekly performed "satyagraha" to win their rights both sides have been at fault.
The Tamils in the Vanni and other areas are not like their caste conscious counterparts in, whose only desire has been to retain their political power, and rule the North as absent landlords. The Vanni Tamils ("Malabars" in the language of the 1815 Kandyan Treaty, and also in Cleghorn's report to the Colonial office), like the Singhalese, have a lot in common as our religion, social organization and language are very similar to that of the Sinhalese people. Although GGP and SJV attempted to emphasize differences, these are the same stock of people with mere superficial differences.
The LTTE is a creation of the elitist Colombo Tamils who decided to use the lower caste "boys" in far-flung areas to promote their misguided political struggle making our children mere cannon fodder. Meanwhile, their children, kith and kin have gone abroad and continue to finance a psychopath who has eliminated out teachers, our kurukals, writers, journalists, political leaders and thinkers, so as to create a subservient society toeing his line with no questions asked, in the name of Eelam.
So, Kumaran what is there to be negotiated?
Kumaran is proposing conflict resolution via negotiations. As Anton Balasingham once stated, "Only the borders remain to be negotiated". It should not be forgotten that the Arasu Kachchi, while talking of Gandhian methods, secretly supported the creation of young militant groups. SJV personally met and worked with Sivakumaran, who was the first to commit suicide by swallowing cyanide.
I am sorry to say that the Tamil leaders of the 1930s, and then the ultra-nationalist activism of the SJV platform have been largely responsible for the plight of the Tamils today. Blaming the Sinhalese for all our ills won’t do. We need to soften our acrimonious uncompromising stand.
Trying to solve ethnic conflict through federalism will lead to bigger ethnic trap
August 15th, 2007
By Thomas Johnpulle
Supporters of federalism have spun up ahead of the ‘final’ battle in the North. Most of them fear that if the armed forces defeat the LTTE militarily, along with it the devolution endeavour will die. There are both supporting and opposing arguments; however, the real issue is the desirability and sustainability of a federal set-up.
Federalism cannot bring peace
A simple question posed by many opposed to federalism is ‘can it bring peace’. The answer is no. Many proponents of federalism argue that a utopian devolution mechanism to which everyone would eventually subscribe will cause things to happen in favour of bringing about peace. But the causal connection is too remote to rely on. Our bitter experience is that there can never be any practical devolution unit/mechanism/degree that all stakeholders can agree upon. Also the few available devolution mechanisms failed miserably to achieve any hint of peace. On the contrary; it was the 13th amendment and the resultant PCs that dragged the LTTE back to war (with the IPKF); it was CBK’s ‘package’ that caused so much pandemonium within and outside the parliament and eventually led to the untimely demise of her 2000-elect administration; devolution and its extent (ISGA verses nothing from the government) was the cause for the breakdown of peace talks in 2002. This is why successive governments call it a two-pronged strategy, a military strategy on one hand and a devolution attempt on the other. What this means is that Fed. or no Fed. war will continue until the annihilation of one fighting party.
Suppose a federal structure was put in place; then what? If the armed forces continue to remain in the N-E thereafter and even after the LTTE is ‘militarily weakened’, what are the chances of peace in the N-E? Many fear a jobless army is more dangerous as the US army in Japan, the IPKF in Jaffna after they ‘liberated’ it and the Russians in East Germany! On the other hand, if the armed forces leave the N-E, the ‘weakened LTTE’ will bounce back.
More complex issues exist about the police force.
Therefore, federalism cannot bring peace and only law and order can. For peace to hold, unlawful armed groups should be disarmed and lawful armed groups should uphold the law!
What does federalism has for the majority Sinhalese?
If nothing or nothing significant, call them whatever you will, they won’t support it; it is as simple as that. When a new election system was proposed recently, the SLMC declared that it will reduce the number of Muslim representatives in parliament and therefore they oppose it. Same fate will befall the federalism endeavour if the majority are not awarded substantial or at least significant benefits. In this context, it is important to consider the plight of minority Sinhala settlements in Trinco, Batti, Ampara, Vavuniya, Nuwara-Eliya, etc. under a federal set-up. They should be convinced that they will be better-off than they are under the central government. This is a very difficult thing to achieve given the complete lack of Sinhala representation among the political parties that are in strength in the N-E including TNA, SLMC, EPDP, PLOTE, TMVP, etc. The bottom line is they don’t trust these race-based political parties however much they try to contradict the ground realities - they are unable to command any trust from the Sinhala voters.
I have not seen anywhere how federalism can (as opposed to any other set-up) give the Sinhalese anything ‘extra’. Hence, most of them will not support a federal system. Their desire for a peaceful settlement of the ‘conflict’ should not be mistaken for a ‘federal system’ that places them under Tamil and Muslim political parties in whom they have zero trust and will add another overhead burden on the country just as the PCs.
A sustainable solution as opposed to one adopted under duress
If the international community pressurise the voters, parties and the government to agree to a federal set-up, the question arrises how sustainable it is?
Suppose, a federal solution is put in place after a lot of haggling, pressurising, etc. If it cannot bring about economic and political betterment in tangible proportions, the opposing forces will amass votes to bust it and that’s exactly what they will do when elected. Therefore, federal systems will not be able to be sustained unless they can add sizable amount of value to the aspirations of the majority. There is no point calling them names in order to avoid such an eventuality as it will surely happen. Can the international community suppress the opposing forces forever and can they continue to sustain the fragile ‘yes’ vote in favour of it? Very unlikely.
On the other hand, if a resolution can be reached that gratifies the popular vote base; such a system will be protected and promoted by the masses.
It is regrettable that most ‘political solutions’ disregard the aspirations of the majority and I do not think they will keep silent once the federalism matter hots up. Some of their (popular) leaders should be blamed for their part for not actively engaged in the process apart from opposing it outright.
Economics of federalism and the economic resources of regions
Who should benefit from the economic benefits of the Trincomalee harbour; the so-called ‘oil reserves’ off Manar; the remnants of the Mahaweli project in the N-E; huge mineral deposits especially along the N-E coastline?
Should it be the residents in these regions or the nation as a whole? Should these be sold outright, processed and then sold or left untouched?
These are the questions that can cripple any federal set-up. Regional leaders and national leaders will have widely opposing views. It is easy to say the whole country will eventually benefit, but practically it is very difficult as evidenced from around the world. Matters will get even worse if foreign parties enter the fray which is very likely to happen. Should we end up as East Timor where its oil resources are used by Australian companies with no benefits to East Timor and Indonesia?
On another count, should the Centre manage foreign investment inflows based on national criteria or should the regions manage it. The USD 300 million annually collected from the Tamil Diaspora will play a major role (it is approximately 1.3% of the GDP and without an obligation to repay) if utilised to achieve sectarian ends.
Already many concerned individuals have pointed out this matter and there will surely be more forthcoming.
Diplomacy
Should the regions be allowed to formulate their diplomatic priorities or should they follow the central government? If they do not have such powers, the regions will surely demand it. It is no secret that Tamils want much closer ties with Canada, UK, Switzerland and Tamil Nadu than now and similarly Muslims would want closer link-ups with the Islamic World. Tamil Nadu, Canada, Saudi Arabia and Iran are likely to have heightened diplomatic importance to the various regions. Apart from obvious conflicting interests among Saudi and Iranian interests (there were a few disturbing developments in the East last year), how can Tamil Nadu and Indian interest be managed by the Lankan central government and the regions? These conflicting interests will surely interplay with other matters like the Chinese developments in H’tota that includes a navel base.
Simply we are heading into diplomatic anarchy under federalism. On the other hand, if the regions’ rights to diplomatic interests are curtailed, would federalism achieve its desired targets?
National elections
Federalism can bring about more or less self-governing authorities in the regions. As a result, people’s interest in national elections may reduce. It should be noted that the voters’ turnout at the last presidential elections from 1988 to 2005 has been below 40% for the N-E as a whole. In the 1994 general election only 8 (eight) votes were cast from Jaffna district. If this happens, the significance and influence of national elections will reduce and as a result, the rights of individuals of certain communities will reduce. This is a very dangerous situation especially for the minorities living outside the N-E.
It is impossible to sustain a similar level of interest for regional elections and national elections at the same time when the regions enjoy substantial autonomy. Making it compulsory to vote as in some other countries would achieve little in this country.
Conflicts over water resources
A classic example is the Murrey Darling Basin development program of the Australian federal government. This is not supported by states amidst a severe drought that has hit Australia. Victoria has repeatedly and decisively declined to cooperate as it has enough water resources. Sri Lanka is not too far away; it should be recalled that this concern was embedded into the ISGA-2003 proposals by the LTTE which stated (the reality) that most waterways flow from outside their territory and hence water users in upper areas should use it carefully. The severity of this is so enormous that the government restarted the war in 2006 following the Mavilaru incident.
It will be unimaginably chaotic in a federal set-up and the army will have to be called-in to settle the matter given the fact that water is as important as gold in the dry zone. Prolonged and persistent conflicts can take a heavy toll and things will surely escalate when political forces interplay with them.
It is foolhardy to expect that our politicians would have national interests in mind than their Australian counterparts!
The risk of outside interferers
Another big risk for the country and the regions is the risk of heightened outside interference. NGOs and even the UN may run their own zones within some regions. In the absence of an acceptable regulator to both the regional and the central governments, these issues are likely to take the centre stage in any federal setting in Lanka.
There are a few defence pacts the country has already signed and there will be conflicts if the regions refuse to honour them. For an example consider the ’super secret’ defence pact with the US. Can US ships (en route to an attack in the Middle East) call at the Trinco navel base when it comes under a predominately Muslim council?
Should the state be selective in its arms purchase that Israeli weapons will not be deployed in certain areas?
If the World Tamil Congregation (banned in India recently) tries to hold their rally in the N-E with the approval of the regional council, can the Sri Lankan government ban it likewise? I doubt it as the government couldn’t ban such events as the ‘Pongu Thamil’ that was nothing but separatist propaganda.
Can India allow federalism to take root in Sri Lanka?
May be yes in 1987 but not now. In 1992 India banned the LTTE not because of Rajeev Ghandi or Sri Lanka, but rather because its influence on India’s own territorial integrity. This was evident in the report that called for a continued ban on the LTTE that was presented to the Indian parliament in 2007. Citing this, prominent constitutional lawyer HL de Silva stated that division of Lanka would be the epitaph of India.
Provided that a federal set-up will result in a more disintegrated Lanka, it is unlikely that India would support it wholeheartedly. It is also concerned about possible Western/Islamic influence in its backyard. This may in part explain why India has played a dormant role as regards federalism in Lanka; even the 13th amendment 20 years ago had little Indian input.
However, what is considered in Sri Lanka is much more dangerous than federalism itself; it is a strange variant that can be described as ‘racial-federalism’. This doesn’t sound well but that’s exactly what most politicians in favour of federalism demand. A separate Muslim Unit within the Tamil Homeland? Separate Sinhala units within each of them? How ridiculously racial? We are likely to fall into a bigger ‘ethnic’ trap if we try to solve the ‘ethnic’ conflict by federalism. My personal view is that we should be moving in a different direction that can integrate the ethnic groups. We don’t differentiate ethnic celebrations, ethnic foodstuff and ethnic attire. We need more than Dosai Villas, Buhari Cafes and Bath Kades; we need our fellow citizens who run them to live and thrive in our nation among us.
Federalism, however, goes against this Lankan spirit to start with! No wonder the forefathers of Lankan federalism were not from Sri Lanka
Entry Filed under: Federalidea
By Thomas Johnpulle
Supporters of federalism have spun up ahead of the ‘final’ battle in the North. Most of them fear that if the armed forces defeat the LTTE militarily, along with it the devolution endeavour will die. There are both supporting and opposing arguments; however, the real issue is the desirability and sustainability of a federal set-up.
Federalism cannot bring peace
A simple question posed by many opposed to federalism is ‘can it bring peace’. The answer is no. Many proponents of federalism argue that a utopian devolution mechanism to which everyone would eventually subscribe will cause things to happen in favour of bringing about peace. But the causal connection is too remote to rely on. Our bitter experience is that there can never be any practical devolution unit/mechanism/degree that all stakeholders can agree upon. Also the few available devolution mechanisms failed miserably to achieve any hint of peace. On the contrary; it was the 13th amendment and the resultant PCs that dragged the LTTE back to war (with the IPKF); it was CBK’s ‘package’ that caused so much pandemonium within and outside the parliament and eventually led to the untimely demise of her 2000-elect administration; devolution and its extent (ISGA verses nothing from the government) was the cause for the breakdown of peace talks in 2002. This is why successive governments call it a two-pronged strategy, a military strategy on one hand and a devolution attempt on the other. What this means is that Fed. or no Fed. war will continue until the annihilation of one fighting party.
Suppose a federal structure was put in place; then what? If the armed forces continue to remain in the N-E thereafter and even after the LTTE is ‘militarily weakened’, what are the chances of peace in the N-E? Many fear a jobless army is more dangerous as the US army in Japan, the IPKF in Jaffna after they ‘liberated’ it and the Russians in East Germany! On the other hand, if the armed forces leave the N-E, the ‘weakened LTTE’ will bounce back.
More complex issues exist about the police force.
Therefore, federalism cannot bring peace and only law and order can. For peace to hold, unlawful armed groups should be disarmed and lawful armed groups should uphold the law!
What does federalism has for the majority Sinhalese?
If nothing or nothing significant, call them whatever you will, they won’t support it; it is as simple as that. When a new election system was proposed recently, the SLMC declared that it will reduce the number of Muslim representatives in parliament and therefore they oppose it. Same fate will befall the federalism endeavour if the majority are not awarded substantial or at least significant benefits. In this context, it is important to consider the plight of minority Sinhala settlements in Trinco, Batti, Ampara, Vavuniya, Nuwara-Eliya, etc. under a federal set-up. They should be convinced that they will be better-off than they are under the central government. This is a very difficult thing to achieve given the complete lack of Sinhala representation among the political parties that are in strength in the N-E including TNA, SLMC, EPDP, PLOTE, TMVP, etc. The bottom line is they don’t trust these race-based political parties however much they try to contradict the ground realities - they are unable to command any trust from the Sinhala voters.
I have not seen anywhere how federalism can (as opposed to any other set-up) give the Sinhalese anything ‘extra’. Hence, most of them will not support a federal system. Their desire for a peaceful settlement of the ‘conflict’ should not be mistaken for a ‘federal system’ that places them under Tamil and Muslim political parties in whom they have zero trust and will add another overhead burden on the country just as the PCs.
A sustainable solution as opposed to one adopted under duress
If the international community pressurise the voters, parties and the government to agree to a federal set-up, the question arrises how sustainable it is?
Suppose, a federal solution is put in place after a lot of haggling, pressurising, etc. If it cannot bring about economic and political betterment in tangible proportions, the opposing forces will amass votes to bust it and that’s exactly what they will do when elected. Therefore, federal systems will not be able to be sustained unless they can add sizable amount of value to the aspirations of the majority. There is no point calling them names in order to avoid such an eventuality as it will surely happen. Can the international community suppress the opposing forces forever and can they continue to sustain the fragile ‘yes’ vote in favour of it? Very unlikely.
On the other hand, if a resolution can be reached that gratifies the popular vote base; such a system will be protected and promoted by the masses.
It is regrettable that most ‘political solutions’ disregard the aspirations of the majority and I do not think they will keep silent once the federalism matter hots up. Some of their (popular) leaders should be blamed for their part for not actively engaged in the process apart from opposing it outright.
Economics of federalism and the economic resources of regions
Who should benefit from the economic benefits of the Trincomalee harbour; the so-called ‘oil reserves’ off Manar; the remnants of the Mahaweli project in the N-E; huge mineral deposits especially along the N-E coastline?
Should it be the residents in these regions or the nation as a whole? Should these be sold outright, processed and then sold or left untouched?
These are the questions that can cripple any federal set-up. Regional leaders and national leaders will have widely opposing views. It is easy to say the whole country will eventually benefit, but practically it is very difficult as evidenced from around the world. Matters will get even worse if foreign parties enter the fray which is very likely to happen. Should we end up as East Timor where its oil resources are used by Australian companies with no benefits to East Timor and Indonesia?
On another count, should the Centre manage foreign investment inflows based on national criteria or should the regions manage it. The USD 300 million annually collected from the Tamil Diaspora will play a major role (it is approximately 1.3% of the GDP and without an obligation to repay) if utilised to achieve sectarian ends.
Already many concerned individuals have pointed out this matter and there will surely be more forthcoming.
Diplomacy
Should the regions be allowed to formulate their diplomatic priorities or should they follow the central government? If they do not have such powers, the regions will surely demand it. It is no secret that Tamils want much closer ties with Canada, UK, Switzerland and Tamil Nadu than now and similarly Muslims would want closer link-ups with the Islamic World. Tamil Nadu, Canada, Saudi Arabia and Iran are likely to have heightened diplomatic importance to the various regions. Apart from obvious conflicting interests among Saudi and Iranian interests (there were a few disturbing developments in the East last year), how can Tamil Nadu and Indian interest be managed by the Lankan central government and the regions? These conflicting interests will surely interplay with other matters like the Chinese developments in H’tota that includes a navel base.
Simply we are heading into diplomatic anarchy under federalism. On the other hand, if the regions’ rights to diplomatic interests are curtailed, would federalism achieve its desired targets?
National elections
Federalism can bring about more or less self-governing authorities in the regions. As a result, people’s interest in national elections may reduce. It should be noted that the voters’ turnout at the last presidential elections from 1988 to 2005 has been below 40% for the N-E as a whole. In the 1994 general election only 8 (eight) votes were cast from Jaffna district. If this happens, the significance and influence of national elections will reduce and as a result, the rights of individuals of certain communities will reduce. This is a very dangerous situation especially for the minorities living outside the N-E.
It is impossible to sustain a similar level of interest for regional elections and national elections at the same time when the regions enjoy substantial autonomy. Making it compulsory to vote as in some other countries would achieve little in this country.
Conflicts over water resources
A classic example is the Murrey Darling Basin development program of the Australian federal government. This is not supported by states amidst a severe drought that has hit Australia. Victoria has repeatedly and decisively declined to cooperate as it has enough water resources. Sri Lanka is not too far away; it should be recalled that this concern was embedded into the ISGA-2003 proposals by the LTTE which stated (the reality) that most waterways flow from outside their territory and hence water users in upper areas should use it carefully. The severity of this is so enormous that the government restarted the war in 2006 following the Mavilaru incident.
It will be unimaginably chaotic in a federal set-up and the army will have to be called-in to settle the matter given the fact that water is as important as gold in the dry zone. Prolonged and persistent conflicts can take a heavy toll and things will surely escalate when political forces interplay with them.
It is foolhardy to expect that our politicians would have national interests in mind than their Australian counterparts!
The risk of outside interferers
Another big risk for the country and the regions is the risk of heightened outside interference. NGOs and even the UN may run their own zones within some regions. In the absence of an acceptable regulator to both the regional and the central governments, these issues are likely to take the centre stage in any federal setting in Lanka.
There are a few defence pacts the country has already signed and there will be conflicts if the regions refuse to honour them. For an example consider the ’super secret’ defence pact with the US. Can US ships (en route to an attack in the Middle East) call at the Trinco navel base when it comes under a predominately Muslim council?
Should the state be selective in its arms purchase that Israeli weapons will not be deployed in certain areas?
If the World Tamil Congregation (banned in India recently) tries to hold their rally in the N-E with the approval of the regional council, can the Sri Lankan government ban it likewise? I doubt it as the government couldn’t ban such events as the ‘Pongu Thamil’ that was nothing but separatist propaganda.
Can India allow federalism to take root in Sri Lanka?
May be yes in 1987 but not now. In 1992 India banned the LTTE not because of Rajeev Ghandi or Sri Lanka, but rather because its influence on India’s own territorial integrity. This was evident in the report that called for a continued ban on the LTTE that was presented to the Indian parliament in 2007. Citing this, prominent constitutional lawyer HL de Silva stated that division of Lanka would be the epitaph of India.
Provided that a federal set-up will result in a more disintegrated Lanka, it is unlikely that India would support it wholeheartedly. It is also concerned about possible Western/Islamic influence in its backyard. This may in part explain why India has played a dormant role as regards federalism in Lanka; even the 13th amendment 20 years ago had little Indian input.
However, what is considered in Sri Lanka is much more dangerous than federalism itself; it is a strange variant that can be described as ‘racial-federalism’. This doesn’t sound well but that’s exactly what most politicians in favour of federalism demand. A separate Muslim Unit within the Tamil Homeland? Separate Sinhala units within each of them? How ridiculously racial? We are likely to fall into a bigger ‘ethnic’ trap if we try to solve the ‘ethnic’ conflict by federalism. My personal view is that we should be moving in a different direction that can integrate the ethnic groups. We don’t differentiate ethnic celebrations, ethnic foodstuff and ethnic attire. We need more than Dosai Villas, Buhari Cafes and Bath Kades; we need our fellow citizens who run them to live and thrive in our nation among us.
Federalism, however, goes against this Lankan spirit to start with! No wonder the forefathers of Lankan federalism were not from Sri Lanka
Entry Filed under: Federalidea
A Federal System Means a Tamil Nadu in Sri Lanka
By Thomas Johnpulle
The naked reality of Indian federalism can be seen from Tamil Nadu. It is terrifying on one hand and kind of outlandish on the other. India has been a federal country. But unlike many other federal countries in the world, its federal boundaries run along racial lines. Nothing much has happened over the years in terms of colonisation of Tamil Nadu by non-Tamils. Over 95% of India’s Tamils still live in Tamil Nadu and over 95% of those who are living in Tamil Nadu are Tamils! There are many freedom struggles across India based on race. Development has done little or nothing to take away separatism.
However, India with its third largest army and the largest paramilitary force in the world has managed to keep separatists under check. When compared to the wealth of the LTTE, India’s separatist fighters are penniless. Tamil Nadu had its own separatist struggle before 1962. It failed owing to many reasons, most importantly thanks to anti-separatism legislation. But the flame of separation has not died. Their desire to be a separate nation is channelled to sympathy for the Tamil Elam struggle across the Palk Strait. At least two Tamils have committed suicide showing support to the ‘liberation struggle’ in Sri Lanka and at least two more have attempted it within the space of a few days.
Open Support for Tamil Elam and LTTE
Most Tamil Nadu political parties support Tamil Elam and the LTTE to various degrees. They have done their share to please the LTTE. This is exactly what will happen in Northern and Eastern parts of Sri Lanka if anything similar to Tamil Nadu is created without proper ethnic integration.
Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Muthuwel Karunanidhi played a number of antics until the Sri Lankan Army Commander’s comments brought him to his senses. Thirumavalavan also showed what he can do with a four day fast unto death! Vaiko used his eloquent nonsense to make his presence felt. These are the type of politicians Sri Lanka will have if a Tamil Nadu is created here.
Given the massive support for the Tamil Elam struggle from Tamil Nadu, one can only imagine the support a local Tamil Nadu will have for it. Therefore when a federal structure creates a Tamil Nadu equivalent in Sri Lanka, federations on both sides of the Palk Strait will be on fire demanding Tamil Elam in one voice.
Rulers of Sri Lanka should not be carried away by petty assurances given by their close associates who are either running regional administrations in the north-east at the moment or tipped to become administrators in the near future. The period of honeymoon won’t last long. Their camaraderie is only with the incumbent President and no sooner he leaves office, hell will break out.
The outcome of regional elections immediately following military victories cannot be considered representative of ground realities. But as time passes by, seeds of separatism will again germinate as before. They have almost a century-old divisive/racial political infrastructure to build on.
LTTE – a political affair
Nothing about the LTTE is a political affair in Central India. LTTE ban that was imposed in 1992 continued regardless of who was in power. However, in Sri Lanka the LTTE ban has been a political affair. It was imposed in 1998 by the PA government and within just months after UNP assumed office the ban was lifted in 2002 only to be reimposed by the UPFA government. Political parties made agreements with the LTTE in the lead up to crucial elections in 1989, 1994, 2001 and possibly 2004 and 2005. In simple words main political parties made alliances with the LTTE in all national elections after 1983. If this is the plight of the national political parties, the plight of regional political parties in the north-east will be much worse. They will have to please the remains of the LTTE, its still functioning overseas branches, its ancillary organisations in Canada, UK, Singapore, etc.
Eventually regional administrations in the north-east will become puppets of overseas LTTE branches.
It was reported that the Tamil Nadu police was after troublemakers who caused havoc in the name of supporting Tamil Elam. Police did a good job in quelling trouble. However, in Sri Lanka this will not happen. The police will be either under the regional administration or the central administration. Or it may be torn between the two! In any case the police will be serving its political masters. As a result if a Tamil Nadu equivalent is created in Sri Lanka, its police will be no more than legitimised rebels.
Racial politics
Race-based political parties only care about the people of its race; they don’t pay any attention to others. If a representative from another community is included in their party, he would be just a yesman. Examples are All Ceylon Tamil Congress, Singhala Maka Sabhai, Ilankai Thamil Arasu Katchi, Tamil United Liberation Front, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (registered in 1989), Tamil National Alliance, Muslim Congress, Sihala Urumaya, Hela Urumaya and Sinhalaye Maha Sammatha Boomiputhraya Party. In wide contrast national political parties are concerned about a wide section of the population irrespective of race.
When two race-based political parties compete with each other, the party that is seen as most racist wins because race is the main criteria and the reason for the parties’ existence. Unfortunately this is what happened in north-east politics ever since 1931. A gradual descend is seen from the ACTC to TNA. ACTC was with the 1947 elect government in most part of its existence. Its successor, ITAK, joined with the governing coalition for a shorter span of its existence. TULF and TNA were worse and showed no co-operation whatsoever and the latter being the worse of the two. As explained above this gradual descend into total tribalism is the outcome of competition between two or more race-based parties.
Without a doubt the northern region and the eastern region will be dominated by race-based parties in time to come when the heat of the military victory dies down. That was how these regions have always been! Then it will be much worse than all the above mentioned parties combined. Please note that none of the above mentioned parties had any instrument or establishment to govern at will. In a federal structure or reasonably autonomous structure, these parties will have a large territory and sufficient powers to play with. The outcome will be calamitous.
To make things worse they will influence the central government as well. Their support in forming a ruling coalition in parliament would be crucial and their co-operation would be on condition of support to their agendas. At Presidential elections, they can shut out the voters if they so desire altering the outcome. Like in Tamil Nadu they will flex the muscle to get what they want from the central government. Although the Indian central government, especially the Indian Prime Minister stood firm, Sri Lanka will never have politicians of that calibre!
Racial Federalism
The Northern Province is a Tamil only region after the LTTE succeeded in a double genocide by 1990. If a federal structure is created either along provincial boundaries or racial boundaries, it is ‘racial federalism’ we are talking about. This is not going to solve the ethnic problem. In fact it will only aggravate it by further isolating communities.
Culturally the Northern region will be with Tamil Nadu, not Sri Lanka; spiritually it will be with Tamil Nadu, not Sri Lanka; politically it will be with Tamil Nadu, not Sri Lanka (the sheer number of visits our northern politicians made to Tamil Nadu explains this); economically it will be torn between Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka (especially when thriving trade between the two ‘states’ recommences after the war). Clearly the Northern region will be in most part aligned with Tamil Nadu, India than Sri Lanka!
Is this what the people of Sri Lanka (irrespective of race) want? They have shown otherwise by vehemently rejecting federalism; even toned down versions. Governments had to risk their very existence trying to push these ‘solutions’. As the (political not racial) majority do not support them, they will never succeed on the ground. Forcing federalism (or toned downed versions) on the people under curfew, under siege from a foreign army, under threat of sanctions or any other compulsion will only make it worse.
Another big confusion is about ‘who needs a solution’; should it be Sri Lankans or Tamils? If it is Tamils, and not all Sri Lankans, then there is little justification for non-Tamils to agree on such a solution. It is as simple as that. When 20 million people are craving for solutions to their problems, only solving the problems of Tamils while the others are still hungry and craving, will lead to commotions, if not war.
As long as some proponents of ‘political’ solutions fail to grasp this reality, there cannot be a political solution which means either the parties must battle it out or live with it.
The Right Solution
The right solution should defeat racism, separatism and block the avenues of another potential uprising. As long as the North remains mono-ethnic, race-based politics will rule it as it did from 1931 to this date. This is the ideal breeding ground of racism, separatism and terrorism. In fact the north was the only place race-based politics thrived most. Most separatist leaders emerged from the North and without a doubt according to the Mahaveer listing of the LTTE, most fighters also came from the mono-ethnic North! This is no coincident.
The only way is to ethnically integrate the North as any other province. There is a huge added economic advantage too. There are hundreds of thousands of hectares of arable land and hundreds of kilometres of coastline that offers gainful employment to the farming and fishing communities that are crammed into an unsustainably small area at the moment. Once a thriving economy shared by Sinhalas, Tamils and Muslims is created in the north which in turn benefits the country, the country will be inseparably bound to the north and vice versa. It will also change the mono-ethnic North into a bubbling multiethnic community where race is no longer a political tool.
The North will be as diverse, colourful and beautiful as the National Flag leaving no room for separatism. How can separatists claim it as Tamil homeland (or part of it), if Tamils are only one part of its community?
As a by-product, it will also rubbish the Tamil homelands concept which stood in the way of ethnic integration for over 80 years.
However, the separate Tamil cultural and religious identities must be kept as they are. There is no justification for a dilution of the unique Tamil culture in the name of integration. Separate Tamil political aspirations would disappear in favour of national aspirations.
http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2009/02/federal-system-means-tamil-nadu-in-sri.html
The naked reality of Indian federalism can be seen from Tamil Nadu. It is terrifying on one hand and kind of outlandish on the other. India has been a federal country. But unlike many other federal countries in the world, its federal boundaries run along racial lines. Nothing much has happened over the years in terms of colonisation of Tamil Nadu by non-Tamils. Over 95% of India’s Tamils still live in Tamil Nadu and over 95% of those who are living in Tamil Nadu are Tamils! There are many freedom struggles across India based on race. Development has done little or nothing to take away separatism.
However, India with its third largest army and the largest paramilitary force in the world has managed to keep separatists under check. When compared to the wealth of the LTTE, India’s separatist fighters are penniless. Tamil Nadu had its own separatist struggle before 1962. It failed owing to many reasons, most importantly thanks to anti-separatism legislation. But the flame of separation has not died. Their desire to be a separate nation is channelled to sympathy for the Tamil Elam struggle across the Palk Strait. At least two Tamils have committed suicide showing support to the ‘liberation struggle’ in Sri Lanka and at least two more have attempted it within the space of a few days.
Open Support for Tamil Elam and LTTE
Most Tamil Nadu political parties support Tamil Elam and the LTTE to various degrees. They have done their share to please the LTTE. This is exactly what will happen in Northern and Eastern parts of Sri Lanka if anything similar to Tamil Nadu is created without proper ethnic integration.
Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Muthuwel Karunanidhi played a number of antics until the Sri Lankan Army Commander’s comments brought him to his senses. Thirumavalavan also showed what he can do with a four day fast unto death! Vaiko used his eloquent nonsense to make his presence felt. These are the type of politicians Sri Lanka will have if a Tamil Nadu is created here.
Given the massive support for the Tamil Elam struggle from Tamil Nadu, one can only imagine the support a local Tamil Nadu will have for it. Therefore when a federal structure creates a Tamil Nadu equivalent in Sri Lanka, federations on both sides of the Palk Strait will be on fire demanding Tamil Elam in one voice.
Rulers of Sri Lanka should not be carried away by petty assurances given by their close associates who are either running regional administrations in the north-east at the moment or tipped to become administrators in the near future. The period of honeymoon won’t last long. Their camaraderie is only with the incumbent President and no sooner he leaves office, hell will break out.
The outcome of regional elections immediately following military victories cannot be considered representative of ground realities. But as time passes by, seeds of separatism will again germinate as before. They have almost a century-old divisive/racial political infrastructure to build on.
LTTE – a political affair
Nothing about the LTTE is a political affair in Central India. LTTE ban that was imposed in 1992 continued regardless of who was in power. However, in Sri Lanka the LTTE ban has been a political affair. It was imposed in 1998 by the PA government and within just months after UNP assumed office the ban was lifted in 2002 only to be reimposed by the UPFA government. Political parties made agreements with the LTTE in the lead up to crucial elections in 1989, 1994, 2001 and possibly 2004 and 2005. In simple words main political parties made alliances with the LTTE in all national elections after 1983. If this is the plight of the national political parties, the plight of regional political parties in the north-east will be much worse. They will have to please the remains of the LTTE, its still functioning overseas branches, its ancillary organisations in Canada, UK, Singapore, etc.
Eventually regional administrations in the north-east will become puppets of overseas LTTE branches.
It was reported that the Tamil Nadu police was after troublemakers who caused havoc in the name of supporting Tamil Elam. Police did a good job in quelling trouble. However, in Sri Lanka this will not happen. The police will be either under the regional administration or the central administration. Or it may be torn between the two! In any case the police will be serving its political masters. As a result if a Tamil Nadu equivalent is created in Sri Lanka, its police will be no more than legitimised rebels.
Racial politics
Race-based political parties only care about the people of its race; they don’t pay any attention to others. If a representative from another community is included in their party, he would be just a yesman. Examples are All Ceylon Tamil Congress, Singhala Maka Sabhai, Ilankai Thamil Arasu Katchi, Tamil United Liberation Front, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (registered in 1989), Tamil National Alliance, Muslim Congress, Sihala Urumaya, Hela Urumaya and Sinhalaye Maha Sammatha Boomiputhraya Party. In wide contrast national political parties are concerned about a wide section of the population irrespective of race.
When two race-based political parties compete with each other, the party that is seen as most racist wins because race is the main criteria and the reason for the parties’ existence. Unfortunately this is what happened in north-east politics ever since 1931. A gradual descend is seen from the ACTC to TNA. ACTC was with the 1947 elect government in most part of its existence. Its successor, ITAK, joined with the governing coalition for a shorter span of its existence. TULF and TNA were worse and showed no co-operation whatsoever and the latter being the worse of the two. As explained above this gradual descend into total tribalism is the outcome of competition between two or more race-based parties.
Without a doubt the northern region and the eastern region will be dominated by race-based parties in time to come when the heat of the military victory dies down. That was how these regions have always been! Then it will be much worse than all the above mentioned parties combined. Please note that none of the above mentioned parties had any instrument or establishment to govern at will. In a federal structure or reasonably autonomous structure, these parties will have a large territory and sufficient powers to play with. The outcome will be calamitous.
To make things worse they will influence the central government as well. Their support in forming a ruling coalition in parliament would be crucial and their co-operation would be on condition of support to their agendas. At Presidential elections, they can shut out the voters if they so desire altering the outcome. Like in Tamil Nadu they will flex the muscle to get what they want from the central government. Although the Indian central government, especially the Indian Prime Minister stood firm, Sri Lanka will never have politicians of that calibre!
Racial Federalism
The Northern Province is a Tamil only region after the LTTE succeeded in a double genocide by 1990. If a federal structure is created either along provincial boundaries or racial boundaries, it is ‘racial federalism’ we are talking about. This is not going to solve the ethnic problem. In fact it will only aggravate it by further isolating communities.
Culturally the Northern region will be with Tamil Nadu, not Sri Lanka; spiritually it will be with Tamil Nadu, not Sri Lanka; politically it will be with Tamil Nadu, not Sri Lanka (the sheer number of visits our northern politicians made to Tamil Nadu explains this); economically it will be torn between Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka (especially when thriving trade between the two ‘states’ recommences after the war). Clearly the Northern region will be in most part aligned with Tamil Nadu, India than Sri Lanka!
Is this what the people of Sri Lanka (irrespective of race) want? They have shown otherwise by vehemently rejecting federalism; even toned down versions. Governments had to risk their very existence trying to push these ‘solutions’. As the (political not racial) majority do not support them, they will never succeed on the ground. Forcing federalism (or toned downed versions) on the people under curfew, under siege from a foreign army, under threat of sanctions or any other compulsion will only make it worse.
Another big confusion is about ‘who needs a solution’; should it be Sri Lankans or Tamils? If it is Tamils, and not all Sri Lankans, then there is little justification for non-Tamils to agree on such a solution. It is as simple as that. When 20 million people are craving for solutions to their problems, only solving the problems of Tamils while the others are still hungry and craving, will lead to commotions, if not war.
As long as some proponents of ‘political’ solutions fail to grasp this reality, there cannot be a political solution which means either the parties must battle it out or live with it.
The Right Solution
The right solution should defeat racism, separatism and block the avenues of another potential uprising. As long as the North remains mono-ethnic, race-based politics will rule it as it did from 1931 to this date. This is the ideal breeding ground of racism, separatism and terrorism. In fact the north was the only place race-based politics thrived most. Most separatist leaders emerged from the North and without a doubt according to the Mahaveer listing of the LTTE, most fighters also came from the mono-ethnic North! This is no coincident.
The only way is to ethnically integrate the North as any other province. There is a huge added economic advantage too. There are hundreds of thousands of hectares of arable land and hundreds of kilometres of coastline that offers gainful employment to the farming and fishing communities that are crammed into an unsustainably small area at the moment. Once a thriving economy shared by Sinhalas, Tamils and Muslims is created in the north which in turn benefits the country, the country will be inseparably bound to the north and vice versa. It will also change the mono-ethnic North into a bubbling multiethnic community where race is no longer a political tool.
The North will be as diverse, colourful and beautiful as the National Flag leaving no room for separatism. How can separatists claim it as Tamil homeland (or part of it), if Tamils are only one part of its community?
As a by-product, it will also rubbish the Tamil homelands concept which stood in the way of ethnic integration for over 80 years.
However, the separate Tamil cultural and religious identities must be kept as they are. There is no justification for a dilution of the unique Tamil culture in the name of integration. Separate Tamil political aspirations would disappear in favour of national aspirations.
http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2009/02/federal-system-means-tamil-nadu-in-sri.html
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